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This Article is the first to use computational methods to investigate the 
ideological and partisan structure of constitutional discourse outside the courts.  
We apply a range of machine-learning and text-analysis techniques to a newly 
available data set comprising all remarks made on the U.S. House and Senate 
floors from 1873 to 2016, as well as a collection of more recent newspaper 
editorials.  Among other findings, we demonstrate (1) that constitutional discourse 
has grown increasingly polarized over the past four decades; (2) that polarization 
has grown faster in constitutional discourse than in nonconstitutional discourse; 
(3) that conservative-leaning speakers have driven this trend; (4) that members of 
Congress whose political party does not control the presidency or their own 
chamber are significantly more likely to invoke the Constitution in some, but not 
all, contexts; and (5) that contemporary conservative legislators have developed 
an especially coherent constitutional vocabulary, with which they have come to 
“own” not only terms associated with the document’s original meaning but also 
terms associated with textual provisions such as the First Amendment.  Above and 
beyond these concrete contributions, this Article demonstrates the potential for 
computational methods to advance the study of constitutional history, politics, and 
culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States Constitution says nothing about political parties.1  The political parties, 
however, routinely say things about the Constitution.  Ever since the Founding, appeals to the 
canonical text by elected officials and other actors in the party networks have helped to shape 
policy debates, define public values, and advance competing visions of the nation.2  “The written 
Constitution,” according to one familiar formulation, supplies a highly salient “‘common ground’ 
for all Americans” and thus “a ‘focal point’ for social coordination” and contestation.3  Within 
certain domains, “constitutional discourse has come to constitute the terms of political discourse.”4  
For students of American law, politics, and culture, understanding the partisan dimensions and 
historical evolution of constitutional discourse is of immense interest. 
 
A persistent challenge for scholarship on this subject is that appeals to the Constitution in 
public life are so common that it is all but impossible to gain anything approximating a systematic 
or synoptic grasp of them using traditional methods of legal research.  Case studies can provide 
insight, but they necessarily cover only a small fraction of the terrain.  In this Article, we marshal 
computational methods to address this challenge and illuminate the anatomy of extrajudicial 
constitutional debate.  Applying a range of machine-learning and text-analysis techniques to a 
newly available data set comprising all remarks made on the U.S. House and Senate floors from 
1873 to 2016, as well as a collection of New York Times and Wall Street Journal editorials from 
1993 to 2018, we explore broadly how the constitutional utterances of different partisan and 
 
1 See Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
750, 813 (2001) (“Political parties are absent from the constitutional text . . . .”); see also Daryl J. Levinson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2320 (2006) (“The idea 
of political parties . . . was famously anathema to the Framers . . . .”). 
2 A vast literature touches on these themes.  Recent intellectual and political histories of constitutional 
discourse beyond the courts include PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992); MICHAEL KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1988); Ken I. Kersch, The Talking Cure: How 
Constitutional Argument Drives Constitutional Development, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1083 (2014); and ANDREW 
BUSCH, HERITAGE FOUND., CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2008), 
https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/constitutional-discourse-and-american-government 
[https://perma.cc/NMG5-VY5M]. 
3 Akhil Reed Amar, American Constitutionalism—Written, Unwritten, and Living, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 195, 197 (2013); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (noting that the 
Constitution was meant to be a populist document, “understood by the public,” rather than a technocratic 
“legal code”); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement 
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 322 (2001) (“[O]fficial pronouncements about the meaning of the 
Constitution elicit special forms of engagement from citizens and so become a focal point of normative 
contestation.”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
910–19 (1996) (arguing that the written Constitution serves as a “focal point” for coordinating behavior). 
4 Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. 
L. REV. 521, 538 (1989); cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013, 1072 (1984) (asserting that constitutional law “has always provided us with the language 
and process within which our political identities could be confronted, debated, and defined”). 
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ideological camps have evolved in comparison with one another.5  Like all empirical projects, this 
Article’s methodology and data have inherent limitations, and we detail many of them below.  
Nevertheless, our approach affords a novel and informative lens through which to study 
constitutional discourse—and discord—with heretofore unattainable granularity and scale. 
 
We draw inspiration from an emerging body of (noncomputational) constitutional scholarship 
that advances or implies descriptive claims about the historical development and substantive 
content of constitutional discourse in relationship to partisan politics and political ideology.6  Our 
approach allows us to test some of these claims for the first time, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  It also generates a rich portrait of the constitutional vocabularies that members of 
different political groups have deployed over the course of modern U.S. history.  Our main findings 
include the following: 
 
First, constitutional discourse has grown increasingly polarized over the past four decades.  
Relative to the early and mid-twentieth century, it has become substantially easier for an 
algorithmic classifier to predict, based solely on the semantic content of a constitutional utterance,7 
whether a Republican/conservative or a Democrat/liberal is speaking.8  If “Democrats and 
Republicans now speak different languages”9 in ordinary political discourse, they speak different 
constitutional languages as well.  
 
Second, constitutional discourse has polarized at least as rapidly as (and on most measures 
more rapidly than) nonconstitutional political discourse over this four-decade period.  There is a 
debate among legal theorists as to whether framing arguments in constitutional terms ought to 
dampen, amplify, or reproduce political disagreement.10  We provide mixed evidence on this score.  
While appeals to the canonical text clearly have not in the aggregate been acting as a brake on 
polarization—and on the contrary may be exacerbating it—particularly detailed discussions of the 
Constitution appear to bear fewer markers of partisanship.11 
 
 
5 We describe our data sources infra Part II and our principal methodology infra Part III.  We have 
made all of the data and code that we use publicly available at http:///www.pozentalleynyarko.com.  An 
Online Appendix containing additional tests and results, not displayed in the Article, is available at the 
same website. 
6 See infra section I.A. 
7 Our study design requires us to determine which documents within our corpora include 
“constitutional” utterances and which do not.  We utilize several different protocols to make these 
determinations, as described infra section III.A. 
8 See infra Part IV.  Versions of this Turing-test-like method of measuring partisanship have been used 
in several recent political science papers.  See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (summarizing this 
literature and explaining how our project builds on, and departs from, it). 
9 Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro & Matt Taddy, Measuring Group Differences in High-
Dimensional Choices: Method and Application to Congressional Speech 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 22423, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22423 
[https://perma.cc/VM4W-6E7N]. 
10 See infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra fig. 8 and accompanying text. 
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Third, conservatives have driven much of the recent uptick in constitutional polarization.  In 
the 1960s and early 1970s, liberal Democrats in Congress generated the most distinctive partisan 
constitutional rhetoric.  Beginning around 1980, however, the constitutional utterances of 
relatively conservative Republicans began to catch up (and then some), becoming much more 
distinctive than in prior years.12  Relatedly, we demonstrate that conservatives in recent Congresses 
have developed an especially coherent constitutional vocabulary, with which they have come to 
“own” not only terms associated with originalism and the Framers but also terms associated with 
textual provisions such as the First Amendment.13 
 
And fourth, members of Congress whose party is out of power, either in the sense of not 
controlling the presidency or not controlling their own legislative chamber, are more likely than 
their counterparts across the aisle to invoke the Constitution in any given speech.  Although modest 
across years, this differential has been magnified in certain historical eras.  In particular, 
congressional Democrats were significantly more likely to invoke the Constitution during the Taft, 
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations, and congressional Republicans were far more 
likely to do so during the Obama Administration.14  These results lend soft support to the 
“separation of parties, not powers” thesis that interbranch dynamics depend upon party-unified 
versus party-divided government15—but with an asymmetric twist in specific eras as between the 
two major parties.  They suggest, further, that constitutional rhetoric functions less as a device for 
consolidating authority than as a weapon of the weak in periods of highly polarized legislative 
politics. 
 
These findings—which explore only a fraction of the constitutional issues potentially 
implicated by our corpora16—contribute to legal knowledge along multiple dimensions and, in our 
view, amply repay the effort to investigate extrajudicial constitutional discourse through a 
computational approach.17  Digital text analysis of the sort we perform cannot substitute for the 
traditional “analog” methods of research into legal history, politics, and culture.  But it can be a 
powerful complement.  Some of our findings corroborate previously unverified hypotheses or 
 
12 See infra section V.A. 
13 See infra section V.D. 
14 See infra section V.B. 
15 See generally Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1. 
16 For some preliminary suggestions of follow-on research projects, see infra notes 154–159 and 
accompanying text. 
17 In theory, our principal methodology or something close to it could be applied to judicial discourse 
as well.  For example, it might be possible to ask whether one can predict, using solely the semantic content 
of a circuit court opinion, the composition of the panel according to standard scoring protocols such as the 
party of the nominating president or Martin-Quinn scores.  Yet as compared to the policymakers and pundits 
we study, judges have much less discretion about which topics to discuss and whether to discuss them in 
constitutional terms.  And because all of the opinions in any given case (majorities, concurrences, and 
dissents) tend to be compelled to engage the same set of legal sources and arguments, simply as a function 
of the case’s procedural posture and norms of judicial disputation, we are uncertain how much light 
computational analysis can shed on ideological disparities.  In any event, we leave such inquiries for future 
research. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351339 
6 
 
assumptions, adding texture and detail to a more or less fuzzy standard picture.18  Other findings 
shed light on genuinely open or opaque ground.  And still others may generate new hypotheses 
and research projects of their own.19  More broadly, our findings on the rise of constitutional 
polarization are so strong and so stark, when taken together, that they raise unsettling questions 
about the overall state of American constitutionalism.  Participants in contemporary political 
debates are not simply talking in different ways about the Constitution.  They largely appear to be 
talking past one another. 
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows.  Part I reviews the existing literatures in law and adjacent 
disciplines on constitutional discourse, constitutional polarization, and digital text analysis.  Part 
II describes our data, drawn principally from the Congressional Record and secondarily from the 
editorial pages of the New York Times and Wall Street Journal.  Part III explains our research 
design for distinguishing constitutional from nonconstitutional subject matter (with additional 
details in Appendix A) and for using computational techniques to measure polarization.  Part IV 
supplies illustrative examples of changes in constitutional discourse over the past four decades and 
then presents our core results on polarization in Congress.  Part V explores some possible drivers 
of the polarization that Part IV reveals, from the changing composition of the Republican Party to 
the introduction of C-SPAN in the House (1979) and Senate (1986).  Part VI demonstrates that our 
core results do not appear confined to the floor of Congress, as similar trends have occurred in 
national newspaper editorials.  The Conclusion offers some preliminary thoughts on the 
significance of our findings and the potential for our methodology to advance the study of 
constitutional law and politics. 
 
 
I. FRAMING THE INQUIRY 
 
As indicated above, students of American law, public culture, and political development have 
a longstanding interest in the role of constitutional discourse in congressional debates, newspaper 
editorials, and other extrajudicial forums.20  The existing empirical literature is thin.  Recent 
scholarship on constitutional conflict and partisan politics, however, suggests a number of 
hypotheses that might be tested, at least in part, through computational text analysis. 
 
 
A. Motivations and Research Questions 
 
 
18 For an amusing and instructive general rebuttal to the claim that digital history does not “tell us 
anything new,” see Lincoln A. Mullen, Isn’t It Obvious?, LINCOLN A. MULLEN BLOG (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://lincolnmullen.com/blog/isnt-it-obvious [https://perma.cc/X8CL-TJR7]. 
19 To take just one, we observe that congressional references to the Constitution in general, and to jury 
trial rights in particular, spiked dramatically in the early 1960s—an observation that might imply that 
studies of the civil rights revolution ought to pay closer attention to debates concerning juries.  See infra 
notes 78–81 and accompanying text.  Bruce Ackerman’s 400-plus-page study of the constitutional politics 
of this period, for instance, contains only a few scattered references to juries and no entry for them in the 
index.  See generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
20 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
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The question motivating this Article is whether and to what extent major political blocs in the 
United States have diverged in the ways they think and talk about the Constitution—a phenomenon 
we define as constitutional polarization.  In particular, we wish to investigate whether and to what 
extent Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives use language differently when invoking 
the canonical document.  Such differences may well be indicative of in-group cohesion, out-group 
animosity, and other phenomena associated with “polarization,” but our focus is on discourse.  The 
Article’s working conception of polarization, accordingly, might be characterized as discursive-
differentiation-as-polarization.21 
 
As is well known, the Democratic and Republican parties have moved further apart from each 
other since the 1970s across a range of policy issues.22  The constitutional piece of (or parallel to) 
this polarization story is less well known.  Yet according to careful legal scholars, the two parties 
have developed “fundamentally different” constitutional agendas since the end of the Warren 
Court in 1969, with increasingly inharmonious positions on the Supreme Court and on subjects 
such as criminal procedure, race, religion, and reproductive rights.23  “In addition to becoming 
more ideologically coherent and distinct,” it seems, “the parties have also become more 
constitutionally coherent and distinct over the past several decades.”24 
 
These observations lead us to predict that constitutional discourse has grown more polarized 
in the post–Warren Court era.  Appeals to the Constitution in prominent political settings, we 
anticipate, have devolved into increasingly easy-to-categorize camps depending on whether a 
Republican or a Democrat is speaking.  Such discursive polarization may involve certain 
constitutional terms becoming increasingly “owned” or “dominated” by one political party, or 
certain modes or styles of constitutional rhetoric becoming increasingly associated with particular 
sets of speakers. 
 
21 While commentators have described “polarization” in a variety of ways, the conception advanced 
here fits comfortably with standard dictionary definitions of the term, see, e.g., Polarization, OXFORD 
LIVING DICTIONARIES: ENGLISH, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/polarization 
[https://perma.cc/7LZ7-RLTJ] (“Division into two sharply contrasting groups or sets of opinions or 
beliefs.”), as well as with scholarship on what is sometimes called “discursive polarization,” see, e.g., 
Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 778 & n.159 (2008); Philip 
Leifeld, Reconceptualizing Major Policy Change in the Advocacy Coalition Framework: A Discourse 
Network Analysis of German Pension Politics, 41 POL’Y STUD. J. 169, 192–93 (2013); Justus Uitermark, 
Vincent A. Traag & Jeroen Bruggeman, Dissecting Discursive Contention: A Relational Analysis of the 
Dutch Debate on Minority Integration, 1990–2006, 47 SOC. NETWORKS 107, 111–14 (2015). 
22 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 277 (2011) (“The parties have become purer distillations 
of themselves.  They are internally more unified and coherent, and externally more distant from each other, 
than anytime over the last one hundred years.”); id. at 276 n.2 (collecting political science studies, by Alan 
I. Abramowitz, Barbara Sinclair, and many others, documenting the emergence of hyperpolarized parties).  
23 H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 
641, 641–89 (2004); see also, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy and the Structure of Partisan 
Conflict, 50 IND. L. REV. 141, 168 (2016) (“The contemporary Republican and Democratic Parties 
champion very different constitutional approaches and visions.”). 
24 Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 
965 (2018). 
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The prospect of constitutional polarization raises a host of subsidiary questions.  For instance, 
how does the partisanship of constitutional argument compare with that of nonconstitutional 
argument?  More specifically, does “constitutionalizing” a moral or policy debate tend to aggravate 
or dampen partisan discord?  Legal scholarship furnishes contradictory hypotheses on this score.  
Some scholars assert that constitutional text and doctrine provide a relatively apolitical, legalistic 
grammar for bridging partisan divides and disciplining disagreement25—which implies that 
constitutional polarization ought to be less pronounced than political polarization generally.  Other 
scholars, however, assert that constitutionalizing a debate raises the stakes and fosters corrosive, 
winner-take-all dynamics26—which implies the opposite.  Still other scholars assert that 
constitutional argument is essentially an epiphenomenon of political argument27—which implies 
that constitutional polarization and political polarization ought to move in lockstep.  Investigating 
whether the rate of polarization in constitutional discourse has lagged, eclipsed, or tracked the rate 
of polarization in nonconstitutional discourse might enable us to begin to adjudicate among these 
competing claims. 
 
Other questions concern the substance and sources of constitutional polarization.  Many 
political scientists argue that the Republican Party has driven polarization in Congress since the 
1970s, as Republicans have moved significantly further to the right than Democrats have moved 
to the left in their overall roll-call voting behaviors.28  An influx of very conservative Republican 
 
25 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1350 (2006) (suggesting that “American 
constitutional culture supplies practices of argument that channel the expression of disagreement into claims 
about the meaning of a shared tradition, teaching advocates to express claims of partisan conviction in the 
language of public value” and thereby “disciplin[ing] these claims”). 
26 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
28, 34 (2018) (suggesting that U.S.-style constitutional argument “forces us to deny that our opponents 
have [rights]” and “leav[es] us farther apart at the end of a dispute than we were at the beginning”); David 
E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 940–54 (2016) (suggesting that constitutional 
argument under contemporary U.S. conditions is marked by “mutual mistrust” and accusations of bad faith); 
see also Adam M. Samaha, Talk About Talking About Constitutional Law, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 792–
95 (hypothesizing ways in which “constitutionalizing arguments” might “drive[] down the probability of 
compromise and trust” and “have other alienating and aggravating effects,” but noting that these hypotheses 
are untested and are implicitly rejected by certain constitutional theorists). 
27 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 94 (suggesting that 
“constitutional considerations in congressional decision making” are “epiphenomenal [in] nature,” as 
“Congress is substantially motivated by its view about what the best policy would be”). 
28 For overviews of the evidence, see THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE 
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM 51–58 (paperback ed. 2016); Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of 
Polarization, in AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS’N, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 19, 19–26 (Jane 
Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013); and Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal 
Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1695–701 (2015); see also MATT GROSSMANN & 
DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST 
DEMOCRATS 3 (2016) (arguing that the Democratic Party remains “fundamentally a group coalition,” 
whereas the contemporary Republican Party “can be most accurately characterized as the vehicle of an 
ideological movement”). 
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legislators is often cited as a primary cause,29 among a range of potential candidates.30  One of us 
has argued, together with Joseph Fishkin, that the practice of “constitutional hardball” has followed 
a similar trajectory and that “Republican politicians and activists have promoted their 
[constitutional] themes—originalism, strict construction, judicial restraint—far more vigorously 
than Democrats have promoted any alternative high-level constitutional vision” over this period.31  
Prominent scholars have challenged each of these arguments.32  But if the theories of “asymmetric 
polarization” and “asymmetric constitutional hardball” are to be believed, they would seem to 
imply that any recent uptick in the polarization of constitutional discourse has likewise been driven 
by developments within the Republican coalition. 
 
To the extent that Republicans’ constitutional rhetoric has become increasingly distinctive, a 
possible contributing factor that lends itself readily to text analysis is the rise of originalism on the 
right and the propagation of associated argumentative tropes.  Whereas liberals and Democrats 
largely appear to remain wedded to a philosophy of “living constitutionalism” and to the 
precedents of the Warren Court, conservatives and Republicans have been at the vanguard of a 
movement since the 1970s to interpret the Constitution according to its “original” meaning.33  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that contemporary Republican officials may invoke the Framers’ 
 
29 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 28, at 1698 (“The predominant view is that ideological divergence has 
been driven not by incumbents shifting their ideological position, but rather by the influx of new 
Members—especially Republicans—who are more extreme than their predecessors.”); Nolan McCarty, 
Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal & Chris Hare, Polarization Is Real (and Asymmetric), MONKEY CAGE 
(May 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric 
[https://perma.cc/8WRM-7Y9T] (“[T]he data are clear that [contemporary congressional polarization] is a 
Republican-led phenomenon where very conservative Republicans have replaced moderate Republicans 
and Southern Democrats.”). 
30 See generally Barber & McCarty, supra note 28, at 23–35 (noting that “[a]though there is a broad 
scholarly consensus that Congress is more polarized than any time in the recent past, there is considerably 
less agreement on the causes of such polarization,” and reviewing possible causes). 
31 Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 966. 
32 See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 379 (2014) 
(finding that congressional Democrats moved further to the left than Republicans moved to the right in 
recent decades using a measure of ideology based on campaign contributions rather than voting patterns); 
David E. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball Yes, Asymmetric Not So Much, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 
207 (2018) (disputing the asymmetric constitutional hardball thesis on conceptual and historical grounds). 
33 See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 967 (“Republican officials going back to President 
Nixon have agreed on the necessity of restoring the Constitution’s true, real, lost meaning in the face of 
subversion by liberal judges and politicians.”); Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, 
Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 373 (2011) (“Eighty-five percent of originalists [in 
surveys from 2009 and 2010] identify as or lean toward Republican . . . , whereas 21% of nonoriginalists 
identify as or lean toward Republican . . . .”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 554–74 (2006) (describing the rise 
of originalism as a political practice on the right).  Within the past decade, a small but possibly growing 
number of liberals and Democrats appear to have embraced the language of originalism, whether sincerely 
or strategically.  See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 20 (2014) (arguing that originalism and 
living constitutionalism “are two sides of the same coin”); see also Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, 
Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1844–47 
(2016) (discussing the “impurification” of originalist theory). 
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Constitution more fervently and frequently than their Democratic counterparts.  The Republican 
Party’s 2012 and 2016 presidential platforms, for instance, declared it to be “the party of the 
Constitution.”34  The Democratic Party’s platforms contained nothing comparable.35  Republican 
voters, moreover, are commonly described as caring more about the Supreme Court,36 and “the 
idea that the Republican Party is the sole party of the Constitution has found resonance within the 
Republican Party at both its most elite and its most populist.”37 
 
A separate strand of legal scholarship suggests that the structure of constitutional discourse 
and discord within Congress turns not just on political ideology but also on broader political 
alignments.  In their influential article Separation of Parties, Not Powers, Daryl Levinson and 
Richard Pildes claim that interbranch political dynamics tend to be determined less by the 
constitutional distinction between the legislative and executive branches than by the distinction 
between party-unified and party-divided government.38  Others have challenged this claim, seeking 
to show the continuing vitality of legislative-branch loyalties and the Madisonian conception of 
separation of powers.39  To the extent that Levinson and Pildes are correct that members of 
Congress are more apt to check the president when she is from the other political party, 
congressional discourse may reflect this pattern through a differentially greater proclivity among 
such members to invoke the Constitution. 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, we are interested in a series of interrelated questions about the nature, degree, and 
determinants of constitutional polarization; the relationship of constitutional polarization to 
nonconstitutional polarization; and the implications for the separation of powers.  These questions 
are teed up by, yet untested in, mainstream constitutional law scholarship.  Insofar as they can be 
translated into hypotheses about measurable patterns of discourse in Congress or in leading 
 
34 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 9 (2016), https://prod-cdn-
static.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/367A-7EJX]; REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 
COMM., 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM: WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA 9 (2012), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/414158/2012-republican-national-convention-platform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LQU6-795V]. 
35 Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-Term Perspective, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 12 n.27 
(2018). 
36 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Practice Makes Precedent, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 39 (2017) 
(discussing “the singular importance of the Supreme Court to Republican voters”). 
37 Primus, supra note 35, at 12. 
38 See generally Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1. 
39 See, e.g., JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 28–33 (2017) (arguing that members of Congress still sometimes “defy presidents 
of their own party on policy grounds” and “put their cameral interests ahead of their partisan ones”); David 
Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33–37 (2018) 
(reviewing arguable examples of “institutional loyalty” within Congress, although conceding that such 
loyalty has “eroded over time”); Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist 
Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 213 (2006) (contending that “Levinson and 
Pildes have too much faith that party unity renders structural obstacles unimportant,” as “[p]olitical actors 
bargain in the shadow of the future outcomes dictated in part by our basic constitutional structures”). 
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newspapers, our corpora and our methods allow us to shed new empirical light on them.  The effort 
to enhance understanding of constitutional rhetoric and constitutional conflict seems especially 
important at a time when many worry that political polarization “ranks as the most critical threat 
facing the United States”40 and that “Americans on both the left and the right . . . have come to 
view the Constitution not as an aspirational statement of shared principles and a bulwark against 
tribalism, but as a cudgel with which to attack [political] enemies.”41 
 
We focus mainly on constitutional polarization in the postwar period to keep the scope of this 
study manageable.  But we emphasize that our corpora and our methods may be put to many other 
uses.42  Above and beyond any substantive findings or technical innovations developed here, we 
hope that this Article will inspire others to build on its approach and thereby shape a new research 
agenda, or set of agendas, for public law scholarship. 
 
 
B. Other Prior Literature 
 
In addition to the scholarship summarized in the previous section, a diverse group of prior 
works have used traditional research methods to investigate questions related to ours.  A smaller 
but growing number of works have used computational methods related to ours to investigate 
different questions.  To date, the literature applying computational analysis to extrajudicial 
constitutional discourse has been nearly nonexistent. 
 
Noncomputational scholarship in law and the humanities has explored many discrete aspects 
of extrajudicial constitutional discourse and its relationship to political ideology.  Law professors, 
for instance, have offered close qualitative studies of the constitutional rhetoric and beliefs of 
 
40 Dina Smeltz, Joshua Busby & Jordan Tama, Political Polarization the Critical Threat to US, Foreign 
Policy Experts Say, HILL (Nov. 9, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/415881-political-
polarization-is-the-critical-threat-to-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/A38M-PGML]; see also, e.g., 
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Wobbly Is Our Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/opinion/sunday/democracy-polarization.html 
[https://perma.cc/647R-GDJZ] (“Extreme polarization can wreck even established democracies.  America 
is no exception.  As long as Americans do not overcome their deepening partisan animosities, democracy 
remains at risk . . . .”). 
41 Amy Chua & Jed Rubenfeld, The Threat of Tribalism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/the-threat-of-tribalism/568342 
[https://perma.cc/2MD4-KFM9].  Consequentialists may also glean useful insights from our inquiry.  It is 
well established within positive political theory that increased levels of partisanship in deliberative settings 
can yield different outcomes—for example, by altering incentives for acquiring information or forming 
consensus solutions.  Although some ideological diversity can lead to more informed decisions, “too much” 
partisanship can undermine deliberation, producing negative consequences for welfarist values as well as 
solidarity and trust.  See, e.g., Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information 
Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 638 (2013) (developing a model of 
appellate court panels to this effect); see also Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 25 (noting 
reasons to suspect that the effects of “growing partisanship of language” in Congress “could be profound”). 
42 In the Conclusion, we suggest a variety of additional constitutional hypotheses that might be explored 
with our corpora and methods. 
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particular groups and social movements, such as the Tea Party43 and the National Rifle 
Association.44  Political scientists have chronicled the intellectual and institutional development of  
the modern conservative legal movement.45  Historians have written about the politics of memory, 
with application to constitutionally freighted topics such as slavery and the Civil War.46  A few 
historians and legal theorists have studied the deployment in constitutional discourse of particular 
high-level concepts, such as sovereignty or self-government.47 
 
More recently, digital text analysis has made inroads into a number of public law fields.48  
Comparative constitutional law scholars, for instance, have used automated content analysis to 
identify patterns across written constitutions.49  An interdisciplinary team of authors has used 
computational techniques to identify the writing styles of Supreme Court justices.50  Corpus 
linguistics has become increasingly common in originalist and textualist circles.51  Our colleague 
Kellen Funk, together with Lincoln Mullen, published an article last year in the American 
Historical Review employing digital text analysis to trace the migration of the Field Code across 
the American South and West during the late nineteenth century.52  Closer to this Article’s 
concerns, a student note has applied unsupervised topic modeling to a set of U.S. newspapers from 
1866 to 1884 to evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s theory of non-Article V constitutional amendment.53 
 
43 E.g., Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party’s Constitution, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 559 (2011). 
44 E.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 191 (2008). 
45 E.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR 
CONTROL OF THE LAW (2010). 
46 E.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2002). 
47 E.g., KAHN, supra note 2; KAMMEN, supra note 2. 
48 Two of us have used digital text analysis extensively in our scholarship on private law subjects.  See 
infra notes 84–86 (citing recent works).  For an overview of recent scholarship using digital text analysis 
in fields ranging from life sciences to literary criticism, see Matthew Sag, The New Legal Landscape for 
Text Mining and Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4–
9), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331606 [https://perma.cc/RVL8-HR7K]. 
49 E.g., David S. Law, The Global Language of Human Rights: A Computational Linguistic Analysis, 
12 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 111 (2018). 
50 Keith Carlson, Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Rockmore, A Quantitative Analysis of Writing Style 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461 (2016); see also id. at 1472–73 (discussing “a 
nascent movement” in the legal literature to apply computational stylistic analysis to judicial opinions); id. 
at 1467–68 (reviewing other applications of computational analysis to Supreme Court–related texts); 
Michael A. Livermore, Allen B. Riddell & Daniel N. Rockmore, The Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 841 (2017) (using topic modeling to study whether the Supreme “Court’s 
writings as a whole have grown more semantically distinctive over the course of the twentieth century, as 
compared to the judicial opinions issued by other American courts”). 
51 E.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018); 
James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics and Original Public Meaning: 
A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016).  
52 Kellen Funk & Lincoln A. Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital Text Analysis and U.S. Legal 
Practice, 123 AM. HIST. REV. 132 (2018). 
53 Daniel Taylor Young, Note, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using Algorithmic 
Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990 
(2013); cf. David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153, 164 n.31 (2016) (stating that 
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Outside of law, political scientists and computer scientists have used a variety of techniques to 
mine the texts of political speeches and manifestos.  The majority of these studies seek to exploit 
the texts as a means to measure the ideology of their creators.54  In contrast, our primary focus lies 
not in finding a good proxy for political ideology per se, but in comparing the ease with which 
speakers from different partisan and ideological camps can be predicted over time.  
 
This Article is most closely related to a new paper by Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse Shapiro, and 
Matt Taddy, who use machine-learning methods to classify remarks made by members of 
Congress and find that the partisanship of their language has “exploded” since 1994.55  We build 
upon and extend Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy’s pioneering work in multiple ways.  
Schematically, as the first authors to examine the entire Congressional Record over multiple 
decades, their paper is largely exploratory, whereas we focus on a set of hypotheses derived from 
legal scholarship.  Methodologically, rather than relying on a generative model of discourse, we 
use the predictive quality of machine-learning algorithms to estimate and quantify polarization.  In 
so doing, we follow a nascent trend in the literature on digital text analysis to measure polarization 
based on the quality of automated classifiers.56  And substantively, we identify and analyze a 
particular subset of remarks that relate to the Constitution, with nonconstitutional remarks 
functioning as a kind of control group benchmark.  As far as we are aware, this Article is the first 
 
“[a]s of August 6, 2015, a search of Westlaw’s database of law reviews and journals” yielded only one 
result—Young’s note—for the term “topic model” and zero results for the terms “automated content 
analysis” and “text analysis”). 
54 See, e.g., Daniel Diermeier, Jean-François Godbout, Bei Yu & Stefan Kaufmann, Language and 
Ideology in Congress, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 31 (2011) (using Support Vector Machines to predict the 
ideology of senators based on speeches in the 101st to 108th Congresses); Mohit Iyyer, Peter Enns, Jordan 
Boyd-Graber & Philip Resnik, Political Ideology Detection Using Recursive Neural Networks, PROC. 52ND 
ANN. MEETING ASS’N COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 1113 (2014) (creating a corpus of sentences and 
phrases from congressional debates that were hand-annotated by human coders for the predicted ideology 
of the speaker, then using a recursive neural network to estimate the speaker’s ideology); Michael Laver, 
Kenneth Benoit & John Garry, Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data, 97 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 311 (2003) (using a word-scoring technique to determine the policy positions of 
political parties in Britain, Ireland, and Germany based on their party manifestos and legislative speeches); 
Jonathan B. Slapin & Sven-Oliver Proksch, A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positions 
from Texts, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 705 (2008) (using a scaling algorithm to locate German political parties on 
a left–right spectrum based on party manifestos). 
55 Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 3, 17.  Their paper appears to be the first to use 
“statistical predictability in a probability model of speech as a metric of differences in partisan language 
between groups.”  Id. at 4–5. 
56 Of particular note, see Andrew Peterson & Arthur Spirling, Classification Accuracy as a Substantive 
Quantity of Interest: Measuring Polarization in Westminster Systems, 26 POL. ANALYSIS 120, 120 (2018) 
(demonstrating that “machine learning ‘accuracy’” at predicting the party affiliation of parliamentary 
speakers “provides an informative measurement instrument for the degree of aggregate polarization in the 
UK House of Commons over time”); and Joseph Engelberg, Matthew Henriksson & Jared Williams, The 
Partisanship of Financial Regulators (July 10, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) 
(employing machine-learning classifiers to analyze the partisanship of speeches by Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) commissioners and Federal Reserve Board governors since the 1930s, and finding a 
significant increase at the SEC over the past two decades). 
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to use computational techniques to investigate constitutional polarization—or, for that matter, any 
other question concerning the ideological or partisan structure of constitutional discourse outside 
the courts. 
 
 
II. DATA SOURCES 
 
Our principal data set consists of a “substantially verbatim” transcript of remarks made by U.S. 
senators and representatives on the floors of the Senate and the House of Representatives from the 
43rd Congress (beginning in 1873) through the 114th Congress (beginning in 2015).57  These data 
were recently made available by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy, who cleaned and parsed the text 
of the Congressional Record.58  Extensions of Remarks, used by members of the House to insert 
statements and materials not read aloud on the House floor,59 are excluded, as are all other 
unspoken statements and materials inserted in the record and all remarks made by nonlegislators 
(for example, a chaplain or a clerk).60  Even though much of the work of Congress occurs in 
committees and attendance at floor debates may be spotty, these debates are of potential interest 
to nonattending members, executive and judicial actors, journalists, voters, and interest groups, 
among other audiences, and have been found to be “crucial” to congressional deliberation and the 
development of legislation.61 
 
Consistent with the literature on digital text analysis, we will refer to the individual remarks in 
the data set as “documents.”  The overall collection of remarks is the “corpus.”  Each document in 
the corpus is complemented with additional information, including the speaker’s name and 
political party affiliation, the date, and the chamber in which the remark was made.  
 
The original creation of the corpus relied on optical character recognition (OCR) to convert 
images of Congressional Record pages into machine-encoded text.  While OCR processes have 
become increasingly precise, accuracy still varies with the quality of the image and the font used 
in the original text.  Upon inspection, it became apparent that the word “Constitution” was either 
 
57 See MILDRED L. AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93-60 GOV, THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: 
CONTENT, HISTORY, AND ISSUES 6 (1993) (describing the Congressional Record as “a substantially 
verbatim account of the proceedings of Congress” and “an account of everything that is said and done on 
the floors of the House and Senate”). 
58 Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro & Matt Taddy, Congressional Record for the 43rd–114th 
Congresses: Parsed Speeches and Phrase Counts, STANFORD SSDS SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA COLLECTION 
(Jan. 16, 2018), https://data.stanford.edu/congress_text [https://perma.cc/H32H-7UWD].  For a detailed 
description of this process, see Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 6–8 & Online App. 
59 See AMER, supra note 57, at 8. 
60 See Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 6.  Following Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy, we 
use the bound edition of the Congressional Record through the 111th Congress and the daily edition 
thereafter.  See id. 
61 GARY MUCCIARONI & PAUL J. QUIRK, DELIBERATIVE CHOICES: DEBATING PUBLIC POLICY IN 
CONGRESS 6 (2006); see also STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND 
SENATE 237 (1989) (noting that “floor speeches are used by members to explain their votes and advertise 
themselves; and, what is perhaps just as important, discussion at the floor stage contributes to the sense of 
legitimacy and fairness of congressional decisions”). 
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misspelled or miscoded several hundred thousand times in the data set, primarily in the early 
periods of observation.  To avoid time-dependent inaccuracies when scanning the text for 
references to “Constitution” and similar terms, we identified and corrected these misspellings 
using a procedure that makes use of word embeddings.62 
 
Like virtually all very large textual data sets, the corpus contains dozens of common multiword 
phrases (or n-grams).  The informational content of these phrases is different from the 
informational content of their individual terms, a fact that is of particular importance when 
predicting a speaker’s political affiliation.  For instance, a phrase such as “eminent domain” might 
be especially popular among conservative or Republican speakers, even if the terms “eminent” 
and “domain” on their own have no determinate political valence.  To account for this possibility, 
we trained and applied a well-known phrasing model that identifies common phrases and connects 
their component parts with an underscore (“_”).63  Once joined, such multiword phrases can be 
treated as a single term.  In addition, before analyzing the corpus, we cleaned the textual data using 
a variety of standard text-processing protocols designed to convert or remove certain characters to 
allow for accurate analysis.64 
 
 
62 Word embeddings are vector representations of words that preserve the words’ semantic meaning 
relative to other words—a process that can be used to generate approximate synonyms based on contextual 
usage.  We calibrated a common word-embedding model on the entire Congressional Record and queried 
our model for the 5000 most similar terms to the word “Constitution” and its variants.  This calibration 
resulted in many instances of misspelled terms, such as “Contitution” or “Constiution.”  We then used an 
automated process to correct these misspellings where they appeared.  A manual audit suggests that our 
process successfully corrected virtually all misspellings.  Our trained word embeddings are available at 
http://www.pozentalleynyarko.com. 
63 See Tomas Mikolov, Ilya Sutskever, Kai Chen, Greg Corrado & Jeffrey Dean, Distributed 
Representations of Words and Phrases and Their Compositionality, 26 ADVANCES NEURAL INFO. 
PROCESSING SYS. 3111, 3115–16 (2013). 
64 These preprocessing steps include (1) converting all words to lowercase, (2) removing all punctuation 
and special characters, and (3) shortening words to their grammatical stems.  Steps 1 and 2 are self-
explanatory.  Step 3 involves removing prefixes and suffixes from individual words, leaving only the word 
stem.  The motivation for stemming is that terms originating from the same word stem should be treated 
the same, as morphological affixes are substantially the product of grammatical rules and conventions rather 
than the actual meaning of the word. 
By way of illustration, consider the following sentence: <Our study explores statements in Congress, 
making use of text analysis!>.  After preprocessing, the sentence is mapped to: <our studi explor statement 
in congress make use of text analysi>.  Each resulting term represents a grammatical stem from which many 
tenses or other word forms might emanate.  For example, “studi” effectively stands in for “study,” 
“studying,” “studies,” and “studied.” 
Another common step in preprocessing is to remove so-called stop words, such as common 
conjunctions and prepositions, as these words are generally assumed not to contain important information 
yet render analysis more complex.  We opted against utilizing this procedure.  A critical step in our analysis 
involves scanning the text for common constitutional phrases, and some of these phrases include stop 
words: for instance, “bill of rights.”  Because omitting these stop words would increase the probability of 
false positives, we preserve them. 
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Table 1 provides a summary of all remarks with an identified speaker.65  Overall, the data set 
includes 13.5 million documents, comprising a total of 1.8 billion words spoken by 37,059 senators 
and representatives between 1873 and 2016. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Congressional Record Corpus 
 
 
 
Although this Article focuses on the remarkably rich and politically pivotal Congressional 
Record data set, we are mindful that constitutional discourse occurs in many other extrajudicial 
venues.  As a robustness check on some of our results from Congress as well as an inquiry of 
independent interest, we also draw on a more limited data set of editorials in two of the leading 
newspapers on the liberal and conservative sides, respectively: the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal.  Using the ProQuest and Factiva databases, we harvested the content of every 
editorial by each newspaper’s editorial board (rather than a named op-ed contributor) that was 
published from 1993 to November 2018,66 cleaning and parsing these data in a similar manner as 
with the text of the Congressional Record.  The resulting corpus, discussed in Part VI, contains 
57,884 editorials.  Approximately 42% of the editorials are from the Journal and 58% from the 
Times, with an average length of slightly over 500 words per document. 
 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The central goal of this Article is to use machine-learning techniques to capture and trace the 
evolutionary path of constitutional polarization as manifested in the text of congressional remarks 
(and secondarily newspaper editorials).  Accordingly, our analysis must make distinctions along 
three principal dimensions:  
 
(1) Constitutional subject matter.  We focus on “constitutional” documents, using 
“nonconstitutional” documents as a benchmark for comparison. 
 
 
65 A small percentage of the documents in the corpus (typically between one and three percent per 
Congress) do not have identifiable speaker information associated with them.  See Gentzkow, Shapiro & 
Taddy, supra note 9, at Online App. 9 tbl.1 (“Match rate” column).  We exclude these documents from all 
analyses. 
66 Specifically, we harvested the content of every editorial in this period for which full-text extraction 
was available and the author was either anonymous or identified as “Editor” or “Editorial Board.” 
Overall Republicans Democrats Other Parties Overall Republicans Democrats Other Parties Overall Republicans Democrats Other Parties
House 6,948,729 3,329,459 3,566,290 52,980 96,510 46,242 49,532 768 124 117 130 113
(33,797) (18,839) (19,445) (1,079) (348) (348) (347) (390)
Senate 6,597,629 2,963,678 3,554,774 79,177 91,634 41,162 49,372 1,147 140 136 144 147
(38,535) (17,928) (27,704) (1,907) (392) (381) (400) (445)
Before 1900 1,892,233 968,781 872,520 50,932 67,580 34,599 31,161 1,819 98 96 100 114
(18,703) (9,149) (15,049) (2,379) (405) (399) (409) (442)
1900–1940 4,387,229 2,211,877 2,137,247 38,105 109,681 55297 53,431 953 81 76 87 97
(42,200) (25,107) (25,039) (1,286) (279) (260) (297) (325)
1940–1980 4,634,858 1,844,510 2,754,896 35,452 115,871 46,113 68,872 886 130 129 131 154
(25,230) (11,442) (19,715) (1,396) (340) (334) (343) (421)
1980–Present 2,632,038 1,267,969 1,356,401 7,668 73,112  35,221 37,678 256 236  228 243 327
(23,568) (13,604) (12,581) (284) (485) (490) (479) (672)
Total Number of Remarks Average Number of Remarks per Congress Average Length of Remarks per Congress
(Standard Deviation) (Standard Deviation)
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(2) Speaker ideology.  We distinguish between “liberal” and “conservative” and between 
Democratic and Republican voices. 
 
(3) Dynamic effects.  We evaluate trends over time and the extent to which the trends 
appear to be driven by any specific party or ideology. 
 
These three dimensions are captured heuristically by Figure 1 below.  Rows capture the content 
of a document (whether it has constitutional subject matter).  Columns capture the ideology of the 
speaker (liberal versus conservative; or alternatively, Democratic versus Republican).  The depth 
dimension captures time (whether the document occurs early or late in the observation period).  It 
is important to note that Figure 1 reflects the simplest possible rendering of these three dimensions 
by breaking them into binary groups.  In actuality, our data allow us to subdivide each dimension 
along more granular margins.  For example, the ideology of congressional speakers might be 
represented by continuous political scores on the Poole-Rosenthal scale;67 the “constitutional-
ness” of a document might be captured by the intensity with which it invokes constitutional terms; 
and time might be measured on a far more refined scale such as day/month/year/Congress. 
 
Figure 1: Heuristic 2x2x2 Design 
 
 
 
Two of these dimensions, Early/Late and Liberal/Conservative, are relatively intuitive.  But at 
least two aspects of our enterprise are more complex.  First, our inquiry requires us to devise a 
means for identifying and distinguishing between “constitutional” and “nonconstitutional” 
documents (the rows of Figure 1).  Second, we must advance a plausible and reliable measure of 
“polarization” that is also sufficiently scalable to evaluate large corpora such as the Congressional 
Record.  We discuss these two challenges and our proposed solutions in turn. 
 
 
A. Constitutional Versus Nonconstitutional Subject Matter 
 
The first hurdle that our study design presents is how to determine what it means for a 
document to have constitutional subject matter.  There is no off-the-shelf solution.  Leading 
 
67 See generally KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). 
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scholars have described the U.S. Constitution as “a model instance of . . . an essentially contested 
concept,” which “few treat . . . as having an easily knowable, fixed identity.”68  It is not hard to 
imagine how two constitutional lawyers might read the same document—say, a speech about the 
history of the civil rights movement that never invokes the Constitution by name—and come to 
different conclusions about whether the document sounds in a constitutional register.  Accordingly, 
in classifying the documents in our corpora as “constitutional” or “nonconstitutional,” we must 
take care to pursue a strategy flexible enough for us to vary our classification criteria for the sake 
of testing robustness, all the while preserving replicability. 
 
In general, several approaches are possible for attempting to classify documents in a corpus by 
subject matter.  The simplest and most intuitive approach asks whether a document utilizes a 
specified combination of terms within a designated lexicon (or “dictionary”) defined by the 
researcher.69  An alternative approach, sometimes called supervised learning, exposes human 
coders to a random subset of documents and asks them to make subject matter classifications 
directly and subjectively.  That coded subset can then be used to train an algorithmic classifier to 
identify similar syntactical patterns in the remainder of the corpus.  Supervised learning 
approaches have been shown to have considerable power in parsing legal texts, as they can 
leverage the expertise of human classifiers in interpreting nuance and context.70 
 
Although we experimented with variants of both techniques, we ultimately settled on a 
dictionary-driven approach for numerous reasons.  First, supervised learning necessarily entails 
using contemporary human coders to classify documents, yet our study design requires us to track 
the evolution of constitutional polarization over multiple decades (indeed centuries).  As one goes 
back further in time, the reliability of supervised learning for distinguishing constitutional from 
nonconstitutional content breaks down: turns of phrase that would be clear markers of 
constitutional discourse to a reader today might have had very different connotations a half century 
ago, and vice versa.71  Second, even within a given historical era, the constitutional judgments 
made by human coders might be affected by unconscious and unobservable ideological 
conditioning, whose bias we can neither measure nor predict.  Finally, in investigating the 
polarization of constitutional discourse, our chief interest lies in identifying unambiguously 
constitutional arguments tied to the canonical document itself.  Given this interest, as well as the 
perpetual disagreement over the nature of constitutionalism and the legitimate sources of 
 
68 SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 124 (2d ed. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY § 1.01, at 3 (4th ed. 2013) (“A colleague 
likes to say that ‘the trouble with constitutional law is that nobody knows what counts as an argument.’ It 
may be more accurate to say that plenty of people think they know what does or should count, and that they 
often disagree.”); Anne Meuwese & Marnix Snel, ‘Constitutional Dialogue’: An Overview, 9 UTRECHT L. 
REV. 123, 123 (2013) (noting that “the academic and the practical legal community still appears to be unsure 
what qualifies as a ‘[constitutional] dialogue’ either in practice or in theory”). 
69 This approach can also be extended through word embeddings, which use the dictionary as a seed to 
train an algorithmic protocol to “learn” functional synonyms of the specified key words.  See supra note 62 
and accompanying text. 
70 See Eric L. Talley, Is the Future of Law a Driverless Car? Assessing How the Data-Analytics 
Revolution Will Transform Legal Practice, 174 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 183, 196–203 (2018). 
71 Because a time machine was not within our allocated research funds for this project, we were unable 
to recruit human classifiers from the relevant historical eras. 
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constitutional meaning, it is all the more important to employ a highly transparent and replicable 
classification strategy, even if the strategy ends up being somewhat mechanical as a result. 
 
We thus employ a series of dictionaries of constitutionally relevant expressions to determine 
whether—and to what degree—a document is deemed “constitutional.”  These dictionaries, which 
we created prior to our analysis, generally have a nested structure, such that each successive 
dictionary (with one exception) incorporates its predecessors and then adds additional terms.  
Appendix A lists the terms contained in the dictionaries, along with an explanation of how they 
were constructed.72  None of the dictionaries is tethered to the Congressional Record; all can be 
ported to other research projects.  In addition to enabling the present inquiry, it is our hope that 
these dictionaries will enable future inquiries by scholars from diverse disciplines into the 
constitutional dimensions of textual data.  The dictionaries’ composition is as follows: 
 
• Minimal.  This is the simplest and starkest dictionary, limited to the term “constitution” 
and all variants and stems thereof (“constitutional,” “unconstitutional,” 
“nonconstitutional,” “extraconstitutional,” “constitutionally,” “unconstitutionally,” 
and so forth).73  Using the Minimal dictionary, a document would be deemed 
constitutional if and only if it explicitly mentions this term. 
 
• Textual.  This dictionary includes the Minimal dictionary and, in addition, the titles of 
all constitutional articles, amendments, and clauses, both in their standard legal 
formulations (for example, “second amendment”) and in well-recognized colloquial 
synonyms (for example, “right to bear arms amendment”). 
 
• Extended Textual.  This dictionary includes the Minimal and Textual dictionaries and, 
in addition, dozens of phrases that appear in the text of the Constitution and lack a 
common extraconstitutional usage (for example, “advice and consent,” “equal 
protection,” and “searches and seizures”). 
 
• Originalism.  This dictionary consists of a variety of terms associated with the 
constitutional founding and the Constitution’s original meaning (for example, 
“founding fathers,” “original intent,” and “philadelphia convention”).  This dictionary 
does not build on the others described above and, in that sense, is an outlier within our 
set; we constructed it specifically to investigate the rise of originalism.74 
 
72 In general, as Appendix A explains, each of our dictionaries was constructed in an expansive fashion, 
resolving doubts about the “constitutional-ness” of a term in favor of inclusion.  However, at the risk of 
losing some potentially interesting information, we opted against including case names in any dictionary 
because of their inherent time-boundedness.  For a similar reason, we omitted judicial neologisms that 
would not have appeared in constitutional discourse before they were introduced in recent cases. 
73 The preprocessing of the text, described supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text, renders 
punctuation and capitalization irrelevant and guarantees that we capture all variants of the word stem 
“constitut.”  At the same time, we took care not to stem words such as “constitute,” “constitutes,” and 
“constituted” to avoid conflation.  Our approach does run the risk of capturing invocations of foreign 
constitutions and the fifty states’ constitutions, but everything we have seen from our data suggests that 
such invocations are very rare on the floor of Congress relative to references to the U.S. Constitution—and 
remarks about U.S. state constitutions, at least, arguably deserve to be included for purposes of this study.  
74 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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• Expansive.  This dictionary includes the Minimal, Textual, Extended Textual, and 
Originalism dictionaries and, in addition, over 100 important constitutional concepts 
that are at least several decades old (for example, “administrative state,” “freedom of 
contract,” “judicial review,” “separate but equal,” and “separation of powers”).  The 
construction of this dictionary involved a considerable amount of subjective judgment.  
Some version of this dictionary is indispensable, however, if one wishes to investigate 
not only what constitutional scholars call the “big-C,” “large-C,” or “written” 
Constitution—the canonical document that dates from 1787 and is the focus of the other 
dictionaries—but also what is known as the “small-c” or “unwritten” constitution, or 
“the web of documents, practices, institutions, norms, and traditions that structure 
American government.”75 
 
The baseline results presented in Parts IV and V rely on the Minimal dictionary.  Our principal 
justification for this decision is that it supplies the most straightforward and uncontroversial means 
of identifying “constitutional” documents.  It also efficiently captures the possibility, implicated 
by many of the hypotheses we explore, that explicit invocations of the Constitution serve a 
distinctive role in political rhetoric.  Moving beyond the Minimal dictionary reduces the risk of 
false negatives (failing to classify constitutional documents as such), but it increases the risk of 
false positives and introduces concerns about potential arbitrariness and bias in our estimates.76  
Consequently, our baseline approach can be described as deliberately underinclusive.  That said, 
we recognize that relying on the Minimal dictionary may be too crude and conservative in some 
respects, and that documents in our corpora may contain terms and themes that are widely 
understood to be of constitutional import even if they never once mention variants of the word 
“constitution.”  We therefore use the larger dictionaries as a robustness check and also, in Part V, 
as a tool for illustrating in greater detail the content of constitutional polarization.  
 
Using any given dictionary, we can ask not only whether the expressions in that dictionary 
appear in a document but also how often they appear.  In this way, we can extract a constitutional 
“score” (ρ) for each document.  Its functional form is: 
 
ρ =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
 
 
 
75 Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2013); see also, e.g., 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, at xi (2012) (describing the “unwritten 
Constitution” as a set of extratextual practices, precedents, and norms that help to “fill in [the] gaps” of and 
“to stabilize” the written Constitution); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE 
L.J. 2, 33 (2014) (describing the small-c constitution as “the relatively stable set of rules, practices, and 
arrangements that are not housed in the constitutional text but nonetheless are thought to serve a 
constitutional function because they are important to the structure of government or because they reflect 
fundamental American values” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
76 Consider again the example of a speech about the history of the civil rights movement that never 
invokes the Constitution by name (and the debate that might be had over whether this speech is best 
understood as a “constitutional” document or not).  See supra text accompanying note 68. 
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The resulting score is always between 0 and 1, and it can be interpreted as a “density” measure of 
constitutional content for each document.  The greater the fraction of total terms in the document 
that are found in the relevant dictionary, the higher the value of ρ.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the frequency distribution of ρ for Congressional Record documents.  The 
left-hand panel of Figure 2 uses the Minimal dictionary.  The right-hand panel uses the Extended 
Textual dictionary.  In Parts IV and V, we rely especially on the Extended Textual dictionary for 
robustness checks because it contains many more terms than the Minimal dictionary while still 
remaining tightly tied to the Constitution’s text. 
 
Figure 2: Conditional Distribution of Constitutional Scores (ρ) 
 
 
The great majority of documents in the corpus contain no terms from either dictionary (98% and 
97%, respectively) and thus have a score of ρ = 0.  For purposes of illustration, Figure 2 excludes 
these zero-score documents, displaying a relatively smooth conditional distribution for the 
population of documents with positive ρ scores.77 
 
For a given dictionary, our key criterion for distinguishing constitutional from 
nonconstitutional subject matter hinges on where a document’s ρ score sits relative to a series of 
hypothesized cutoff values.  All documents with ρ scores exceeding the specified cutoff are 
deemed to involve constitutional discourse.  Documents with scores of 0 are deemed in all cases 
to be nonconstitutional.  Documents with scores greater than 0 but below the specified cutoff are 
 
77 To promote readability, we also exclude from both plots 3110 documents (0.0002% of the corpus) 
with extreme values of ρ > 0.08. 
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deemed ambiguous and are therefore excluded from the analysis.  The higher the level at which 
the cutoff is fixed, then, the more restrictive is the test for inferring constitutional subject matter. 
 
Because there is no inherently correct way to select the cutoff, we make use of the flexibility 
that a score-based approach affords to vary the classification criteria, effectively modulating 
between narrower and broader conceptions of what counts as constitutional discourse (holding 
constant the dictionary).  For our baseline results using the Minimal dictionary, we fix the critical 
cutoff at 0, such that any mention of a variant of the term “constitution” results in the document 
being classified as constitutional.  For our robustness checks using the Extended Textual 
dictionary, we set the cutoff at three progressively restrictive values.  First, as with the Minimal 
dictionary, we fix the cutoff at 0.  Next, we set the cutoff at the conditional median, such that half 
of the documents with positive scores are classified as constitutional.  This point occurs at a value 
of around ρ = 0.005.  Finally, we set the cutoff at the conditional eighth decile, such that only the 
highest-scoring 20% of documents with positive scores are classified as constitutional.  This point 
occurs at a value of approximately ρ = 0.017. 
 
Figure 3: Share of “Constitutional” Documents (by Congress) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts the relative frequency of “constitutional” documents in the Congressional 
Record over time, pursuant to each of the approaches just described.  The most permissive 
approach uses a cutoff of 0.  Again, this is equivalent to defining a document as constitutional if 
any term from the applicable dictionary is mentioned.  The brown dotted line is higher than the 
golden line because the Extended Textual dictionary contains more terms than the Minimal 
dictionary.  Naturally, definitions based on the median and eighth-decile cutoffs lead to fewer 
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documents being classified as constitutional.  Under the most restrictive standard, fewer than 1% 
of documents are deemed to involve constitutional discourse.  While the overall frequencies of 
constitutional documents may appear low (by any measure), the gargantuan size of the 
Congressional Record ensures that there are still an ample number of remarks to work with. 
 
We have not yet reached our results, but Figure 3 itself unveils a trove of new information for 
constitutional scholars and historians.  For instance, it reveals that on multiple measures, levels of 
constitutional discourse in Congress surged in the immediate postwar period, reaching their apogee 
in the 88th Congress of 1963 and 1964 (for the green and purple lines).  The underlying data show 
that among all of the terms in the Extended Textual dictionary apart from “constitution” itself, 
congresspersons invoked “fourteenth amendment,” “equal protection,” and “bill of rights” most 
frequently in that Congress.78  If one looks at these congresspersons’ use of additional terms from 
the Expansive dictionary, one finds that they invoked “civil rights,” “trial by jury,” and “jury trial” 
most frequently.79  These findings might be seen to support Ackerman’s claim that the civil rights 
movement and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 together amounted to a transformative 
“constitutional moment.”80  At the same time, they suggest that constitutional debate has never 
taken up a large percentage of congressional floor time and that the absence of juries from 
Ackerman’s constitutional narrative is a significant omission.81 
 
More broadly, Figure 3 demonstrates that even as the share of all remarks made on the House 
and Senate floors that mention the Constitution or a specific provision thereof has generally been 
rising since the early 1900s, the share of all remarks that include a large number of terms present 
in the Constitution (ρ > 0.017) has generally been declining since the mid-1900s.  This may imply 
that while contemporary members of Congress are more likely than their predecessors to invoke 
the Constitution in any given remark, they also tend to do so in a relatively superficial manner.  
 
 
B. Assessing Polarization Through Classification 
 
Having established both a set of dictionaries and criteria for identifying constitutional subject 
matter, we turn to the principal measure of interest for this study: the degree of “polarization” 
manifested in a document’s textual content.  Here as well, several avenues suggest themselves.  
One obvious candidate is to ask human coders to read and score each document (or a random 
subset) on a partisanship scale.  As before, such an approach faces severe constraints.  The first is 
the sheer size of the Congressional Record corpus, a full or even remotely thorough reading of 
 
78 Online App., tbl. OA.1. 
79 Id. 
80 See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 118–19. 
81 See supra note 19.  On the intersection of local jury practices and the civil rights struggle during this 
period, see, for example, Leo Adde, American Jury System: Reexamination and Change, in 2 EDITORIAL 
RESEARCH REPORTS 686, 695 (1972), 
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1972091300 [https://perma.cc/5P62-
K74F] (“The American jury system endured one of its severest crises during the height of the civil rights 
movement in the South during the 1960s.  When civil rights violations, including murder, were prosecuted, 
it became obvious that a double standard for meting out justice existed.”). 
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which would require an infeasible amount of time and labor.  Another concern is coding error, a 
risk that may be exacerbated by repetitive tasks.  Human coders may also disagree about the 
partisan or ideological nature of a particular document, leading to inconsistent classifications.  
And, as noted above,82 because human coders are unavoidably creatures of their historical era, they 
may be too tethered to contemporary linguistic and social cues to generate reliable measures over 
time. 
 
Given these concerns, we pursue an alternative means for measuring polarization—through 
algorithmic classifiers.  Specifically, we propose to measure polarization by evaluating how easy 
or hard it is for a machine-learning algorithm to predict a speaker’s political ideology or party 
affiliation based solely on the text of her remarks.83  If the algorithm has a difficult time making 
such predictions, it suggests a lack of polarization, as even speakers from opposing camps tend to 
share a common vocabulary and utilize the same focal concepts.  If the algorithm has an easy time 
making such predictions, in contrast, it suggests that speakers from opposing camps are no longer 
employing similar or overlapping rhetoric and are instead “talking past” one another. 
 
Two of us have previously employed machine-learning methods to assess large data sets of 
securities disclosures,84 M&A agreements,85 and other commercial contracts,86 and we pursue a 
similar strategy here.  A simplified description should suffice for conveying its basic elements and 
motivating intuitions.87 Examining the set of documents from each two-year Congress separately, 
we proceed in four incremental steps88: 
 
(1) We divide documents at random into a “training set” and a “test set.” 
 
82 See supra text accompanying note 71. 
83 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (discussing recent political science studies employing 
related approaches).  As Andrew Peterson and Arthur Spirling put it in their study of UK Members of 
Parliament (MPs): “Our central logic is to conceive of [MPs] from different parties as being more or less 
distinguishable over time, in terms of what they choose to say.  How distinguishable they are in practice is 
determined by a set of machine learning algorithms.”  Peterson & Spirling, supra note 56, at 121. 
84 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical 
Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017); Talley, supra note 70, at 
188–201. 
85 Eric Talley & Drew O’Kane, The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing 
Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 181 (2012). 
86 Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! The Lack of Arbitration Clauses in International 
Commercial Contracts, 58 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 6 (2019). 
87 Readers interested in the more technical aspects of this approach are referred to the abovementioned 
articles and the code we have made available online.  For an excellent introduction to the fundamentals of 
machine learning, see TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF 
STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION (2d ed. 2009). 
88 In contrast to the preprocessing that we performed on the textual data for purposes of determining 
the “constitutional-ness” of each document, see supra note 64, for this exercise we did not use text 
stemming.  The reason is that stemming loses a small amount of information that may be relevant for 
analyzing polarization.  For instance, it is possible that there is a difference in the way Democrats and 
Republicans use the word “Constitution” in comparison to the word “constitutional,” but stemming would 
reduce both words to “constitut.”  With that said, whether we stem the text or not is of no significant 
relevance to the performance of our classifier. 
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(2) Using only the training set, we calibrate a statistical algorithm that identifies which 
semantic characteristics of the text are most useful for distinguishing “Conservative” (or 
alternatively, Republican) speakers from “Liberal” (or alternatively, Democratic) speakers.  
This training step results in a calibrated probabilistic estimate as to whether each document 
came from a Conservative or Liberal speaker. 
 
(3) We then apply the trained classifier to the test set of documents, generating predictions of 
speaker ideology for those previously “unseen” documents. 
 
(4) Finally, we assess the classifier’s performance on the test set in terms of its classification 
accuracy as well as other diagnostic measures. 
 
Step 1 is straightforward and is applied to all documents for which the speaker is known.  Each 
iteration of Step 1 specifies an 80%–20% split between training and test sets.89  To perform Step 
2, there are now several classification algorithms available within the machine-learning literature 
for researchers wishing to train a predictive classifier.  For analysis of text, the Multinomial Naive 
Bayes (MNB) classifier works particularly well.90  In rough terms, the MNB classifier tabulates 
the frequencies of various terms’ use by each group (here, Conservatives and Liberals).  It does so 
across all terms and then uses Bayes’s theorem to invert the process, extracting the “reverse” 
conditional probability of speaker ideology given the terms used.91  When the dust settles, every 
 
89 Specifically, we consider several possible divisions of training data and test data using a process 
known as 5-fold cross validation.  The data are randomly assigned to one of five different subsets, each 
containing roughly 20% of observations.  The test set is one of these subsets; the remaining four subsets 
constitute the training set.  After evaluating the classifier’s performance on the test set once, we repeat the 
process but with a different test set, cycling through the process five times.  For instance, in iteration 1, the 
training set is {𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡1, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡2, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡3, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡4} and the test set is {𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡5}.  In iteration 2, the 
training set is {𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡1, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡2, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡3, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡5} and the test set is {𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡4}.  And so on.  The 
performance metrics reported below thus reflect average measures across all five “folds” in the validation. 
90 Even so, our results appear to be robust to other types of classifiers.  In addition to the MNB classifier, 
we examined the quality of the Multilayer Perceptron classifier, the K-Neighbors classifier, the Gaussian 
Process classifier, the Decision Trees classifier, and the C-Support Vector Classification (C-SVC) classifier 
for predicting speakers’ party affiliation for constitutional documents in selected periods.  Only the C-SVC 
classifier, we found, sometimes slightly outperforms the MNB classifier (by about three percent based on 
the “correct classification rate”).  However, the training duration of the C-SVC classifier is more than 
twenty times that of the MNB classifier.  For large data sets such as the Congressional Record, its 
implementation is thus computationally infeasible. 
91 The MNB classifier is called naive because it assumes that the probabilities of any two terms 
appearing together are independent.  This assumption seems overly strong.  For instance, the probability 
that the word “constitution” appears in a document is higher if the word “framers” appears in the document.  
However, it is a well-known property of the MNB classifier that the independence assumption—strong as 
it seems—tends to have negligible impact on the overall quality of predictions.  See, e.g., Harry Zhang, The 
Optimality of Naive Bayes, PROC. 17TH INT’L FLA. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SOC’Y CONF. 
562, 562 (2004) (investigating the “surprisingly good performance” of naive Bayes classifiers in many 
machine-learning applications). 
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term in the training set will be associated with an estimated probability that it came from a 
Conservative versus a Liberal speaker.92 
 
In Step 3, the probabilistic predictive model calibrated in Step 2—the trained MNB classifier—
is applied to the documents in the test set, with the MNB classifier once again rendering a 
probabilistic prediction of ideology conditional on the terms used.  Finally, in Step 4, we evaluate 
the performance of the classifier with a variety of diagnostic measures that capture the 
difficulty/ease of predicting the political ideology or party affiliation of the speaker based on the 
text. 
 
We focus on three well-known measures of classifier performance, which in turn serve as 
measures of polarization.  The first is the fraction of documents that are correctly classified, or the 
“correct classification rate” (CCR): the sum of “true positive” and “true negative” classifications 
divided by the total number of documents.93  The CCR is intuitively attractive and easy to 
understand, but it can also be misleading because it can become skewed with unbalanced initial 
samples.  Suppose, for instance, that the test set contains ninety-nine spoken statements by Liberals 
and only one by a Conservative.  A classifier that simply labels every document “Liberal” would 
achieve a CCR of 99% even though it always incorrectly classifies Conservative statements.  
Accordingly, it is common in the literature to complement the CCR with alternative performance 
measures that are less vulnerable to such pitfalls.  
 
The second performance metric is commonly known as F1.  It is a performance measure that 
more comprehensively combines true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives 
into a single score.94  F1 scores are bounded between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating 
higher classification quality.  
 
The third performance metric we employ is known as the Area Under the Curve of the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic function (AUC-ROC).  This measure generalizes a step further, by 
recognizing that the very definition of true/false positives/negatives turns critically on the 
background criterion used to map the classifier’s probabilistic output onto a categorical 
assignment.  For example, it seems intuitive to classify a document as “Conservative” if the MNB 
classifier returns a probability of greater than 50% that the speaker is conservative (and vice versa 
for “Liberal” assignments).  Indeed, both CCR and F1 use this criterion.  However, nothing is 
sacrosanct about 50%, and one could easily imagine using a 43% or 68% cutoff instead if (say) 
 
92 In predicting a congressional speaker’s political party, we remove the 132,157 documents (0.007% 
of the corpus) that identifiably originate neither from Republicans nor from Democrats (for example, 
remarks by Independents).  While it is possible in principle to predict “third-party” affiliation, this would 
require the training of a multilabel classifier.  Multilabel classification is a significantly more complex and 
less accurate task that does not allow for the implementation of our preferred classifier.  Because only 
0.007% of documents originate from speakers not from the two main political parties, we decided that the 
costs of this undertaking outweighed the benefits. 
93 To convert this standard statistical jargon into party classification, we (arbitrarily) define a “true 
positive” (TP) as a correctly classified Republican document, a “true negative” (TN) as a correctly classified 
Democratic document, a “false positive” (FP) as a Democratic document classified as a Republican 
document, and a “false negative” (FN) as a Republican document classified as a Democratic document. 
94 Formally, F1 scores are defined by the expression: F1 =
2∗𝑇𝑃
2∗𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁+𝐹𝑃
. 
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one placed differential weights on the costs of false positives versus false negatives.  Each 
successive cutoff would generate a different set of true/false positive/negative rates and thus 
different CCR and F1 measures.  The ROC function sidesteps this problem by eschewing a single 
cutoff criterion and instead considering all of them.  Specifically, the ROC plots the true positive 
rate (“specificity”) against the false positive rate (1 minus the “specificity”) as one continuously 
moves the cutoff criterion from 0% to 100%.  In technical terms, the ROC curve represents a 
nonparametric indication of how well the classifier can discriminate between speakers across 
assignment criteria.  The AUC is bounded between 0 and 1, with higher numbers again reflecting 
better overall classification. 
 
In presenting our results, we typically show how our classifier performs on all three of these 
metrics over time, effectively using each as an alternative lens through which to visualize the 
polarization of constitutional discourse. 
 
 
IV. MEASURING POLARIZATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
 
This Part demonstrates that constitutional polarization, as captured by the above-described 
measures, has exploded in Congress over the past four decades.  Based solely on the semantic 
content of a constitutional utterance made on the floor of Congress, it has become increasingly 
easy for a machine-learning classifier to predict whether a Republican/conservative or a 
Democrat/liberal is speaking.  This result is robust across multiple classifiers, multiple tests of 
classifier performance, and multiple tests of what counts as constitutional rhetoric.  On most 
measures, the polarization of constitutional discourse is now every bit as extreme as the 
polarization of nonconstitutional political discourse, if not more so. 
 
 
A. Qualitative Examples 
 
Before turning to these empirical results, let us first offer a peek into the contents of some of 
the documents they classify.  If constitutional discourse was so much less polarized in the past than 
it is today, what did that sound like to listeners?  Our approach in this Article is in many ways the 
antithesis of a case study, and detailed historical research would be needed to recover the texture 
and tenor of constitutional discourse in any given era.  Nevertheless, it may be helpful to consider 
some illustrative examples of actual floor speeches, to give a feel for the micro-level phenomena 
that underlie our macro-level results.  
 
To do so, we generated probabilistic classifications of all congressional documents triggering 
the Minimal dictionary from 1959 to 1976 (earlier period) and, separately, from 1999 to 2016 (later 
period) on a spectrum ranging from most likely to be Republican to most likely to be Democratic.  
We then extracted the ten documents closest to the average of all documents predicted to be 
Republican and to the average of all documents predicted to be Democratic.  That is, we looked at 
a sample of what might be considered the most generic or emblematic Republican and Democratic 
constitutional remarks from each period.95 
 
 
95 For the full results of this inquiry, see Online App., tbl. OA.2. 
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In the earlier period, several emblematic Democratic remarks express constitutional sentiments 
that today might be thought to have a conservative cast.  The most substantial remarks involved 
discussions: of the Supreme Court’s “deeply disturb[ing]” ruling in Engel v. Vitale96 that public 
schools may not hold official recitations of prayers;97 of the perils of military assistance to 
Communist countries and the proposition that “under the Constitution our foreign policies are the 
prerogative of the President”;98 of the inability of Congress to “exercise its proper constitutional 
role” in the budgetmaking process owing to “deceptive information, ground into pablum and spoon 
fed to us by the [Office of Management and Budget]”;99 and of the “humiliating experience” for 
states such as Alabama of being subject to the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance regime and 
thereby “convicted of discrimination without a trial.”100 
 
The emblematic constitutional remarks by Democrats in the later period have a different tone 
and ideological valence.  They include discussions: of the nontreaty status of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;101 
of the constitutional value of legislation to end federal raids on state-licensed medical marijuana 
dispensaries;102 of the “audacity” and unfairness of Republican filibusters of President Obama’s 
judicial nominations;103 and of how in the 2004 federal elections, unlike in the 2000 elections, “we 
are going to be prepared and we are going to utilize every aspect of the Constitution, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and local jurisdictional law . . . to make sure that every vote is counted.”104 
 
In the earlier period, the emblematic Republican remarks are diverse and not easy to 
characterize.  They include recognizably “conservative” discussions of a state judge’s “great 
affection for the Constitution and for the historic American concept of freedom of the 
individual”;105 and of the “doubt . . . in the minds of good lawyers as to the constitutionality” of 
Title IV of the (never enacted) Civil Rights Act of 1966, which would have barred racial 
discrimination in the sale and rental of all housing.106  Yet they also include harder-to-place 
discussions of the importance of passing a law allowing eighteen-year-olds to vote, 
notwithstanding the serious “constitutional questions” raised by such a law;107 and of the likely 
constitutionality and “acceptab[ility] to many on both sides of the aisle” of the (never enacted) 
Cooper-Church amendment meant to bar reintroduction of U.S. armed forces into Cambodia, 
 
96 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
97 110 CONG. REC. 3404 (1964) (statement of Sen. A. Willis Robertson).  Engel is not named in Senator 
Robertson’s remarks, but it is clearly the case he means to criticize. 
98 113 CONG. REC. 32,977 (1967) (statement of Rep. Otto Passman). 
99 119 CONG. REC. 7740 (1973) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie). 
100 116 CONG. REC. 7105 (1970) (statement of Sen. James Allen). 
101 145 CONG. REC. 20,154 (1999) (statement of Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich). 
102 152 CONG. REC. 12,967 (2006) (statement of Rep. Maurice Hinchey). 
103 160 CONG. REC. S1225 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2014) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid). 
104 150 CONG. REC. 18,491 (2004) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee). 
105 106 CONG. REC. 1642 (1960) (statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater). 
106 112 CONG. REC. 18,397 (1966) (statement of Rep. Gerald R. Ford). 
107 116 CONG. REC. 20,166 (1970) (statement of Rep. Thomas Railsback).  Later that year, in Oregon 
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a divided Supreme Court would strike down the provision of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1970 lowering the minimum voting age to eighteen in state and local elections. 
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provided that the amendment “do nothing . . . that impugns the President’s constitutional power as 
Commander in Chief.”108 
 
The emblematic constitutional remarks by Republicans in the later period are more uniform in 
their ideological content and more combative in style.  They include discussions: of how “the 
framers of our Constitution wanted the process of lawmaking to be difficult” and “inefficient”;109 
of President Bush’s opportunity and responsibility, as “Commander in Chief on the domestic 
front,” to call Congress into special session if it fails to act on a stimulus bill before the 2001 winter 
recess;110 of how opponents of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 give “the impression that the 
interstate commerce clause was designed to allow Congress to regulate all violent crime, and any 
other subject that touches Congress’s fancy and that happens to poll well—any subject, that is, 
except for interstate commerce”;111 of George Mason’s and James Madison’s views on the 
selection of House members;112 and of President Obama’s “unconstitutional and unilateral 
decisions . . . to ignore our Constitution.”113 
 
These examples are illustrative only.  But they give a sense of what the polarization of 
constitutional discourse in Congress might look like under a magnifying glass.  As we show below, 
these qualitative impressions persist when we zoom out to a larger scale. 
 
 
B. Baseline Results 
 
We now turn to our principal results.  Figure 4 shows the evolution of partisan polarization in 
Congress (as measured by classifier performance) for constitutional versus nonconstitutional 
remarks, with any remark that triggers the Minimal dictionary treated as constitutional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 116 CONG. REC. 19,186–87 (1970) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole). 
109 145 CONG. REC. 14,973 (1999) (statement of Rep. David Dreier). 
110 147 CONG. REC. 26,451 (2001) (statement of Rep. John Hayworth). 
111 149 CONG. REC. 25,509–10 (2003) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
112 150 CONG. REC. 11,297 (2004) (statement of Rep. Tom Feeney). 
113 161 CONG. REC. H1550 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2015) (statement of Rep. Jody B. Hice). 
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Figure 4: Predicting Party Affiliation by Textual Content  
 
The horizontal axis plots time in two-year increments, corresponding to each Congress since 1873.  
The vertical axis plots, in each successive panel, the three different metrics that we use to assess 
our classifier’s performance: from left to right, CCR, F1 scores, and AUC-ROC.114  Each dot in the 
figure represents an average performance score for constitutional or nonconstitutional remarks in 
that Congress.  To facilitate interpretation, we also fit each set of dots with “smoothed” LOWESS-
curve trend lines and associated 95% confidence bands around the lines.115 
 
A few aspects of these results immediately stand out.  First, they lend little support to the notion 
that framing arguments in constitutional terms tends to discipline disagreement and dampen 
partisanship.116  On the contrary, congressional remarks that invoke the Constitution appear to be 
even more polarized than those that do not.  Second, the polarization of congressional discourse 
has grown dramatically since the late 1970s for both constitutional and nonconstitutional remarks.  
And third, the growth rate of constitutional polarization has tended to equal or exceed the growth 
rate of nonconstitutional polarization. 
 
 
114 See supra section III.B. 
115 Alternatively, confidence intervals could be obtained through bootstrapping.  In this case, however, 
a full bootstrapping process is computationally very intensive and takes several months to complete.  We 
have conducted a preliminary test with fewer observations and were able to confirm that the recent increase 
in polarization is significant.  Results on the full data set will be included in the Online Appendix as they 
become available. 
116 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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Beginning around 1980, our classifier thus finds it increasingly easy to predict the political 
party of a congressional speaker.  As noted in Part I, the Democratic and Republican parties have 
become more internally unified and externally divided during this period.117  It is possible that the 
increasing ideological coherence of the parties is itself driving Figure 4’s results: even if “liberal” 
and “conservative” members of Congress sound exactly as distinct from each other as they did 
before, Figure 4’s results could trend upward because all of the liberals have been leaving the 
Republican Party for the Democratic Party and vice versa.  Another (not mutually exclusive) 
possibility, however, is that liberal and conservative legislators have been speaking in increasingly 
distinctive ways. 
 
Figure 5 tries to tease apart these alternative narratives by showing our classifier’s performance 
at predicting the political ideology of a congressional speaker independent of party affiliation.  For 
this purpose, we use Poole-Rosenthal (PR) scores, which are designed to capture the ideological 
leanings of each member of Congress based on her voting behavior.118  We label each speaker 
“liberal” or “conservative” depending on the relative position of her PR score within the 
distribution of her temporal peers.  A speaker is labeled liberal if her PR score lies to the left of 
the median PR score of her chamber in a given Congress; a speaker is labeled conservative if her 
PR score lies to the right of the median.119  Our classifier then predicts the speaker’s ideology 
without reference to party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism 
Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 958 (2016) (explaining that while in the mid-twentieth century 
the “Democratic and Republican parties were internally diverse confederations,” today they “are instead 
sharply polarized” and “partisanship and ideology have become closely aligned”); id. at 958 nn.12–14 
(collecting political science sources documenting this transformation). 
118 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  More precisely, we use the first dimension of PR scores 
based on the dynamic, weighted nominal three-step estimation procedure known as DW-NOMINATE.  See 
Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis, James Lo, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, DW-NOMINATE 
Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, VOTEVIEW.ORG (Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://www.voteview.org/dwnomin.htm [https://perma.cc/W5NF-9APC].  We do not use the second 
(subsidiary) dimension of PR scores, as it has been of little help in classifying ideology since the late 1960s.  
See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF 
IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 26 (2006) (“From the late 1960s onward, . . . the second dimension has 
abruptly declined in importance.  In the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush eras, it improves classification 
only by about one percent.”).  
119 Consequently, the labels are dynamic in that an individual’s status as a “liberal” or “conservative” 
could change over time if the median legislator in her chamber moves to the right or the left. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351339 
32 
 
Figure 5: Predicting Liberal/Conservative Ideology by Textual Content 
 
 
The results in Figure 5 largely parallel the results in Figure 4.  Both constitutional remarks and 
nonconstitutional remarks have become dramatically more polarized in recent decades, and the 
polarization of the former has, if anything, been more extreme.  This suggests that the partisan 
polarization shown in Figure 4 is not simply a function of the parties’ post-1960s realignment (with 
liberals fleeing the Republican Party and conservatives fleeing the Democratic Party).  Rather, the 
partisan polarization shown in Figure 4 has been driven to some significant extent by the growing 
distinctiveness of liberal versus conservative speech. 
 
In creating Figures 4 and 5, we do not control for any attributes of the underlying documents.  
One might harbor concerns that the constitutional and nonconstitutional documents differ in ways 
that are unrelated to the constitutional/nonconstitutional distinction yet still affect our classifier’s 
performance.  In particular, longer texts—simply by dint of their length—tend to provide more 
opportunities for a classifier to identify distinctive phrases or patterns of speech that are predictive 
of ideology or party.  And constitutional documents might tend to be longer because, for example, 
they are less likely to involve merely procedural or commemorative content. 
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Figure 6: Mean Document Length over Time 
 
 
Figure 6 suggests that this concern is warranted.  The left-hand panel shows a time-series plot 
of the average length of constitutional documents and nonconstitutional documents.  While the 
average length of constitutional documents fluctuates between 500 and 1300 words per Congress, 
the average length of nonconstitutional documents fluctuates between 100 and 300 words.  It 
therefore seems plausible that our protocol for identifying constitutional subject matter 
inadvertently introduces a spurious factor (length) that affects our measure of polarization.  That 
said, whether length should be considered spurious here is open to debate, insofar as the choice to 
give a longer-than-usual speech on the floor of Congress and the choice to invoke the Constitution 
while doing so may be causally related to one another—for instance, because constitutional 
arguments take more time to elaborate or because efforts to advance arguments that are (or appear) 
especially serious or scholarly are more likely to invoke the Constitution toward that end. 
 
While some might therefore believe it better not to control for length, to address any concerns 
on this score we resample our data using a matching technique designed to eliminate differences 
between constitutional and nonconstitutional documents based on length.  Our protocol for doing 
so is as follows.  For every document deemed constitutional, we match it with a nonconstitutional 
document from the same Congress that has the same word count.  If there is no nonconstitutional 
document with the exact same word count, we choose the one that is closest;120 if there are multiple 
matching nonconstitutional documents of equal length, we select one at random.  
Nonconstitutional documents that are never matched are dropped from the analysis.  The right-
 
120 This nonconstitutional document could be slightly longer or shorter than the constitutional document 
with which it is matched.  We choose the nonconstitutional document that minimizes the absolute difference 
in word count. 
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hand panel of Figure 6 illustrates differences in word length after matching.  As can be seen, 
matching successfully removes any meaningful differences in length between constitutional and 
nonconstitutional documents.  We then rerun the analyses behind Figures 4 and 5 on the length-
matched data set.  Figure 7 shows the results. (Figure 7A corresponds to Figure 4; Figure 7B 
corresponds to Figure 5.) 
 
Controlling for document length, it turns out, does not significantly alter our qualitative 
findings.  As before, both constitutional and nonconstitutional remarks have grown increasingly 
polarized since around 1980.  And as before, the rate at which constitutional remarks have become 
polarized is at least as high as the rate for nonconstitutional remarks.  Intriguingly, these length-
controlled comparisons suggest that polarization historically has been lower in constitutional 
discourse than in nonconstitutional discourse, but that in recent decades this gap has disappeared 
or slightly reversed.  In short, controlling for document length not only substantiates our baseline 
results but also makes them appear even starker in certain respects. 
 
Figure 7: Predicting Speakers by Textual Content (Length-Matched Data)  
 
7A. Party Affiliation 
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7B. Liberal/Conservative Ideology 
 
 
 
C. Robustness Checks Using Different Dictionaries 
 
As an additional means to check the robustness of our results, we employ alternative tests for 
distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional documents.  Up to this point (in 
Figures 4, 5, and 7), we have deemed a document constitutional if and only if it contains a variant 
of the term “constitution” and thus triggers the Minimal dictionary.  This baseline approach has 
much to commend it in terms of transparency, replicability, and simplicity, as described in section 
III.A, but it reflects a narrow conception of constitutional discourse.  Accordingly, we explore the 
possibility that changing the test for what counts as constitutional subject matter changes the 
ultimate portrait of polarization. 
 
Figure 8 shows the results of rerunning the analysis with the Extended Textual dictionary and 
three different cutoff criteria for identifying constitutional subject matter.  The Extended Textual 
dictionary, recall, includes not only the term “constitution” but also the titles of constitutional 
articles, amendments, and clauses as well as dozens of phrases that appear in the text of the 
Constitution and lack a common extraconstitutional usage.121  In all of the analyses for Figure 8, 
we use the length-matched data set, controlling for document length across constitutional and 
nonconstitutional remarks.  The top row of Figure 8 shows our classifier’s performance, as 
measured by CCR, at predicting a speaker’s political party.  The bottom row shows its performance 
at predicting a speaker’s liberal/conservative ideology.  Within each row, the left-hand panel shows 
the results when we deem a document constitutional if any term in the Extended Textual dictionary 
appears in it.  The center and right-hand panels show the results when we increase the cutoff 
criterion to the conditional median and the conditional eighth decile of ρ scores, respectively, such 
 
121 See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.  
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that a document is deemed constitutional only if its density of constitutional content is in the top 
half or top fifth of all documents that trigger the Extended Textual dictionary. 
 
Figure 8: Results with Extended Textual Dictionary (Length-Matched Data)  
 
 
The results in Figure 8 are broadly consistent with the results in Figure 7.  The left-hand panels 
show the same explosive growth in polarization, and especially constitutional polarization, since 
around 1980.  The one significant difference between Figure 7 and Figure 8 appears in the right-
hand panels, which show the recent rate of polarization of constitutional discourse lagging rather 
than equaling or exceeding that of nonconstitutional discourse.  The discrepancy between the left-
hand and right-hand panels in Figure 8 is intriguing.  It suggests that whereas relatively superficial 
discussions of the Constitution tend to be more partisan than remarks that have zero constitutional 
content, particularly detailed discussions of the Constitution may bear fewer markers of 
partisanship. 
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Using a broader dictionary also facilitates other types of diagnostic measures for polarization 
that are not possible with the Minimal dictionary.  In particular, a broader dictionary allows us to 
compare how Democrats and Republicans differentially draw on various terms.  Figure 9 explores 
this alternative indicator of polarization using the Extended Textual dictionary (left-hand charts) 
and the Expansive dictionary (right-hand charts).  For each term in the dictionary and for each 
Congress, we compute the average frequency with which the term appears in remarks made by 
Democrats versus the average frequency with which the term appears in remarks made by 
Republicans.  In Figure 9A, we plot the average absolute difference between Democratic and 
Republican usage across all terms in each dictionary, thereby generating a measure of 
“disjointness” in how the political parties invoke these terms.  Under this measure, a higher score 
indicates a greater degree of disjointness in the parties’ use of constitutional rhetoric.  In Figure 
9B, we consider an alternative measure of the extent to which Democrats and Republicans 
differentially draw on a dictionary’s terms: the “cosine similarity” between the parties’ use of all 
terms in each dictionary.  Under this measure, a lower score indicates greater polarization (patterns 
of speech that are more dissimilar).122 All charts plot time series of the relevant scores, by 
Congress. 
 
Figure 9: Talking Past Each Other 
 
9A. Average Absolute Differences 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 More technically, to compute cosine similarity we first translate the corpus into a document-term 
matrix, where the rows represent the documents and the columns represent the counts of terms.  Doing this 
allows each document to be represented as a vector of term counts, and the similarity between two 
documents can be captured by the vector cosine of the angle between the documents’ vector representations. 
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9B. Cosine Similarity 
 
                 
 
As these charts show, there have been several historical periods in which the constitutional 
rhetoric used by Democrats and Republicans became increasingly distinct on one or both 
measures, including the 1930s and 1960s.  The levels of disjointness/dissimilarity during those 
periods, however, pale in comparison to the levels reached during the past several decades.  Indeed, 
all four plots in Figure 9 suggest that Democratic and Republican members of Congress are talking 
past each other in their constitutional rhetoric to a greater extent than they ever have since the 
beginning of our data set in 1873. 
 
 
V. ONE DOCUMENT, TWO DISCOURSES: WHAT DRIVES CONSTITUTIONAL POLARIZATION? 
 
The previous Part documents the growing polarization of constitutional discourse in Congress 
over the past four decades.  Our findings are robust across multiple constitutional dictionaries, 
classification metrics, ideology proxies, and imputation rules for constitutional subject matter.  
These findings are dramatic, unsettling, and the core of this Article’s contribution. 
 
What has been driving the trends that Part IV documents? Teasing out the causes of a 
phenomenon as complex as constitutional polarization requires sustained multidisciplinary study, 
but our research design enables us to make some headway.  In particular, we analyze interactions 
in the data to assess: (1) whether polarization has increased symmetrically or asymmetrically 
across the two parties; (2) whether the prevalence of constitutional rhetoric is related to unified or 
divided government; (3) whether the introduction of television coverage of the House and Senate 
floors has had any appreciable effect on polarization; and (4) whether certain constitutional terms 
have become increasingly associated with Democrats or Republicans.  We discuss each topic in 
turn. 
 
 
A. Asymmetric Constitutional Polarization 
 
Consider first the possibility that one political party has been more responsible than the other 
for the uptick in constitutional polarization.  As noted above, legal scholars and political scientists 
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continue to debate whether and to what extent the recent rise in partisan polarization and 
constitutional hardball has been driven, asymmetrically, by Republicans over Democrats.123  
Qualitative analyses of such phenomena may be subject to any number of subjective biases.124  
Our methods, while no doubt imperfect in various ways, provide an alternative lens through which 
to assess the asymmetry question. 
 
Figure 10: PR Scores and Predicted Conservatism 
 
  
 
Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between the political ideology of congressional speakers 
(as measured by PR scores) and the polarization of their remarks on the House and Senate floors 
(as measured by our classifier’s predictions as to whether a conservative is speaking).  It compares 
 
123 See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.  
124 See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 927–29; Bernstein, supra note 32, at 208–11.  But cf. Joseph 
Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies and a Research Agenda, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 158 (2019) (defending the use of qualitative methods to study patterns and 
practices of constitutional hardball). 
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two historical periods: one from 1959 to 1976 when levels of polarization were relatively low, and 
one from 1999 to 2016 when levels of polarization were relatively high.  The charts in the top row 
of Figure 10 are based on remarks deemed to be nonconstitutional.  The charts in the bottom row 
are based on remarks deemed to be constitutional under our baseline test (that the Minimal 
dictionary is triggered).  The horizontal axis plots PR score intervals across all members of 
Congress, with the vertical purple dotted line indicating the “neutral” score of 0. 
 
The charts in Figure 10 each contain two diagrams.  First, the green dashed/dotted lines depict 
the underlying frequency distribution (or smoothed histograms) of PR scores for Congresses 
within the period.  Note that in both periods this distribution is bimodal, although more so in 1999–
2016, reflecting the virtual disappearance of political neutrals.  Second, and most importantly for 
our purposes, the black solid lines depict the average likelihood that the speaker is predicted by 
our classifier to be conservative based solely on the text of her remarks.  When this black line is 
steep, it suggests a tight relationship between speakers’ ideology as reflected in their voting record 
and their ideology as reflected in the “conservativeness” of their remarks.  A flatter line, in contrast, 
suggests a noisier relationship between voting behavior and rhetoric. 
 
For nonconstitutional remarks (the upper charts), we see ideology and rhetoric becoming more 
closely aligned from the earlier period to the later period for both liberals and conservatives, as the 
slope of the black line increases across all members of Congress.  For constitutional remarks (the 
lower charts), we see a similar shift toward greater alignment of ideology and rhetoric, but with a 
significant asymmetric twist.  In the earlier period, conservative speakers of all stripes tend to 
engage in relatively homogenous constitutional discourse (lower left chart, PR scores above zero).  
In the later period depicted in the lower right chart, however, conservative speakers become much 
more distinguishable by ideology, with relatively extreme conservatives (with the highest PR 
scores) employing a much more distinctive constitutional rhetoric than relatively moderate 
conservatives (with the lowest positive PR scores).  Among liberals (lower charts, PR scores below 
zero), in contrast, the mapping between ideology and constitutional rhetoric shifts only trivially 
across the measured time spans.  These patterns suggest that it is conservatives in Congress—and 
in particular the most conservative conservatives—who have been driving the recent uptick in 
polarization of constitutional discourse.  Although this shift is a stark one even for visual analysis, 
it also manifests in both statistically and behaviorally significant ways using a “regression-kink” 
analysis, as described in Appendix B.125 
 
That said, Figure 10 also suggests that at least part of the reason for this asymmetric-
polarization result is that extreme conservatives have caught up to extreme liberals in the 
distinctiveness of their constitutional rhetoric.  As the lower left chart shows, from 1959 to 1976 
the most liberal liberals were already easy to identify as such through the text of their constitutional 
remarks.  The lower right chart shows that this remains the case. 
 
The overall portrait painted by Figure 10 is thus a nuanced one.  Consistent with the 
“asymmetric polarization” and “asymmetric constitutional hardball” theses, our findings strongly 
support the notion that developments within the Republican coalition have been responsible for 
the post-1970s rise in constitutional polarization—but with the important caveat that these 
asymmetric developments have made the degree of fit between political ideology and 
 
125 See infra App. B, tbl. B.1. 
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constitutional rhetoric more symmetric across the historical liberal/conservative divide.  The big 
change from 1959–1976 to 1999–2016, again, is that the constitutional remarks made by the most 
extreme conservatives in Congress used to be hard to distinguish from the constitutional remarks 
made by the most moderate conservatives, and now the two are relatively easy to differentiate. 
 
 
B. Separation of Parties, Not Powers 
 
Thus far, we have analyzed constitutional polarization in Congress without reference to which 
party holds power.  The “separation of parties, not powers” thesis advanced by Levinson and 
Pildes, however, suggests that “the degree and kind of competition between the legislative and 
executive branches vary significantly . . . depending on whether the House, Senate, and presidency 
are divided or unified by political party.”126  Members of Congress from the same political party 
as the president, Levinson and Pildes emphasize, are more likely to approach interbranch 
interactions in a “cooperative” rather than a “competitive” manner.127 
 
In line with this thesis, members of Congress whose party does not hold the presidency may 
tend to invoke the Constitution more frequently than their counterparts across the aisle, as part of 
their efforts to resist the president’s agenda and generate the “friction” necessary “to save the 
people” from perceived executive overreach.128  For similar reasons, members of Congress who 
are in the minority party within their chamber may tend to invoke the Constitution more frequently, 
as part of their efforts to resist the majority party’s agenda.  Levinson and Pildes’s descriptive 
account has been challenged by some,129 and its implications for constitutional discourse might be 
debated.  But it seems to suggest the possibility that public appeals to the Constitution in Congress 
serve less as a rhetoric of justification or aspiration, wielded by those in power to help explain or 
defend their policies, and more as a rhetoric of opposition wielded by those who find themselves 
on the political margins. 
 
Figure 11 probes this possibility, illustrating the propensity of Democrats and Republicans to 
invoke the Constitution or any of its provisions or phrases (the Extended Textual dictionary) in 
their remarks on the floor, conditional on whether the presidency (top row) or their legislative 
chamber (bottom row) is controlled by their own party or the other party.  The gaps in the smoothed 
lines represent Congresses in which the relevant condition does not apply.  For instance, in the top 
left chart on Republican presidencies, the gaps represent periods in which a Democrat was in the 
White House.  In the bottom row, the charts can have anywhere from zero to four dots per 
Congress, depending on how many of the relevant conditions are met.  For instance, in the 103rd 
Congress beginning in 1993, Democrats controlled both the House and Senate, so in the bottom 
right chart (majority Democratic chambers) there are four dots: one for Democrats in the House, 
one for Democrats in the Senate, one for Republicans in the House, and one for Republicans in the 
 
126 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1, at 2315. 
127 Id. at 2316. 
128 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the 
separation of powers was adopted . . . not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power.  The purpose was not to avoid friction, but . . . to save the people from autocracy.”). 
129 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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Senate.  In the 104th Congress beginning in 1995, by contrast, Republicans controlled both 
chambers, so there are zero dots that year in the bottom right chart and four in the bottom left chart. 
 
Figure 11: Countermajoritarian Constitutional Rhetoric (Extended Textual Dictionary) 
 
 
The overall trends in Figure 11 suggest a mild tendency for members of Congress whose party 
is out of power, either in the sense of not controlling the presidency or not controlling their own 
chamber, to invoke the Constitution more frequently than their counterparts across the aisle.  But 
both the magnitude and the partisan skew of this tendency vary significantly across historical eras.  
In the early twentieth century, another period of high partisan polarization in Congress,130 
Democrats were especially likely to appeal to the Constitution when out of power.  During much 
of the mid-twentieth century, countermajoritarian propensities to invoke the constitution were far 
weaker (and in some cases reversed).  Over the past four decades or so, however, the earlier pattern 
reemerged—but with minority-party Republicans becoming the most intensive invokers of the 
Constitution.  During the Obama Administration, they mentioned the Constitution in an 
unprecedentedly high proportion of their remarks. 
 
130 See, e.g., Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal & Christopher Hare, House and Senate Polarization 
1879–2014, VOTEVIEW BLOG (Dec. 22, 2014), https://voteviewblog.com/2014/12/22/house-and-senate-
polarization-1879-2014 [https://perma.cc/LK65-3KHQ]. 
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In terms of how often members of Congress discuss the Constitution (Figure 11), as well as 
what they say when they do (Figures 4 through 10), partisan discrepancies have thus become both 
increasingly clear and increasingly asymmetric.  In Appendix B, we further document these 
differential patterns across historical eras using regression analysis techniques.131 
 
 
C. Polarization by Chamber and the C-SPAN Effect 
 
The analyses described in the previous sections pool the two chambers of Congress together.  
This pooling helps us to see general trends, but it might also mask important variations across the 
chambers.  Traditionally, the Senate has been perceived as a more deliberative and compromise-
oriented body than the House of Representatives.132  In recent years, however, “most scholars find 
that the political parties have polarized almost as much in the Senate as they have in the House” 
in terms of voting behavior.133  Do our textual measures of constitutional polarization exhibit 
similar tendencies? 
 
To explore this question, we reran the analyses behind Figure 7A—predicting party affiliation 
using the length-matched data set—for each chamber separately.  The results appear in Figure 12.  
For purposes of illustrative clarity, it shows classifier performance for constitutional documents 
only (with all documents that trigger the Minimal dictionary deemed constitutional).  As is 
immediately apparent from Figure 12, constitutional discourse has become significantly more 
polarized in both chambers since around 1980, and levels of polarization are now very similar 
across the two chambers under all three measures of classifier performance.  Interestingly, 
however, our results do not reveal greater polarization in the House in the pre-1980 period.  To the 
contrary, on two of our three measures, constitutional remarks in the House were consistently less 
polarized than constitutional remarks in the Senate from 1873 to 1980, even as both have reached 
unprecedentedly high levels of polarization in recent decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 See infra App. B, tbl. B.2. 
132 See, e.g., DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 5 (1960) (noting that the 
U.S. Senate “proudly calls itself the greatest deliberative body in the world”); Julia L. Ernst, The 
Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues: An Inside Perspective on Lawmaking by and for Women, 12 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 189, 245 n.168 (2006) (“The culture of the two chambers is known to be vastly 
different, with the Senate generally seen as the more genteel, refined, deliberative, broad-minded body 
favoring consultation and compromise . . . .”).  But cf. Daniel Wirls, The “Golden Age” Senate and Floor 
Debate in the Antebellum Congress, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 193, 194 (2007) (using case studies to demonstrate 
that the “House debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the day” in the 
antebellum period). 
133 Sean M. Theriault & David W. Rohde, The Gingrich Senators and Party Polarization in the U.S. 
Senate, 73 J. POL. 1011, 1011 (2011). 
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Figure 12: Partisan Constitutional Polarization in the House Versus Senate (Length-Matched 
Data)  
 
 
 
Separating out the chambers is also useful for investigating another possible factor driving the 
polarization of constitutional discourse, involving what some have called the “C-SPAN effect.”134  
Over the course of the 1970s, the decade immediately preceding the recent surge in polarization, 
both houses of Congress made a series of procedural reforms intended to enhance the visibility of 
their work to the public.135  A growing number of scholars have suggested that this increase in 
transparency may have contributed to an increase in institutional discord and dysfunction—for 
instance, “by preventing legislators from deviating from party messages and by interfering with 
the good-faith search for multidimensional solutions”136—although precise causal influences 
remain difficult to establish.  Of particular relevance for a study of discourse on the House and 
Senate floors, scholars have pointed to the congressionally authorized creation of the C-SPAN 
 
134 See, e.g., Mark J. Rozell & Richard J. Semiatin, Congress and the News Media, in MEDIA POWER, 
MEDIA POLITICS 43, 51 (Mark J. Rozell & Jeremy D. Mayer eds., 2d ed. 2008); Philip Joyce, The Dark 
Side of Government in the Sunshine, GOVERNING (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/col-dark-side-transparency-government.html 
[https://perma.cc/AJ7M-2E6F].  See generally STEPHEN FRANTZICH & JOHN SULLIVAN, THE C-SPAN 
REVOLUTION (1996). 
135 See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 130–32 (2018) 
(discussing these reforms).  For a variety of reasons related and unrelated to these reforms, the floors of 
both chambers became “far more important arenas of substantive policymaking” during the 1960s and 
especially the 1970s than they had been during the early-to-mid twentieth century.  SMITH, supra note 61, 
at 1. 
136 Pozen, supra note 135, at 132; see also id. at 130–33 (reviewing the critical literature on legislative 
transparency). 
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cable network, which airs live broadcasts of all floor proceedings, as a critical inflection point in 
the direction of a more performative, soundbite-driven style of legislative debate.137 
 
Our data permit one avenue for testing the C-SPAN effect, taking advantage of its staggered 
introduction, first in the House (on March 19, 1979) and seven years later in the Senate (on June 
2, 1986).138  A staggered “shock” of this sort can be a helpful device for causal identification, as it 
allows us to use the Senate as a control group for the House’s early treatment (in 1979) and to use 
the House as a control group for the Senate’s late treatment (in 1986).  We can then conduct what 
is commonly known as a difference-in-differences analysis based on our simplest measure of 
discursive polarization (CCR) between the House and Senate, both before and after the 
introduction of C-SPAN.  Some illustrations of this approach are presented in Figure 13.  For this 
analysis, we again use the length-matched data set described in section IV.B and deem documents 
constitutional if they trigger the Minimal dictionary.  The smoothed lines in the left-hand chart and 
the middle chart track the difference in CCR over time between the House and Senate (House CCR 
– Senate CCR).  The left-hand chart shows this difference for constitutional remarks; the middle 
chart shows it for nonconstitutional remarks.  The right-hand chart plots the difference over time 
between the left-hand chart’s results and the middle chart’s results.  The vertical dashed lines 
represent the introduction dates of C-SPAN in the House and Senate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 See, e.g., FRANKLIN G. MIXON, JR. & KAMAL P. UPADHYAYA, LEGISLATIVE TELEVISION AS 
POLITICAL ADVERTISING: A PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH 47 (2003) (discussing evidence that “the presence 
of legislative television at the federal level has increased the value [to legislators] of . . . grandstanding and 
posturing on salient political issues”); Jonathan S. Morris, Reexamining the Politics of Talk: Partisan 
Rhetoric in the 104th House, 26 LEG. STUD. Q. 101, 114–15 (2001) (“[T]his study has shown that members 
of Congress make attempts to appeal to [the C-SPAN] audience by instituting their own version of the 
legislative sound bite.”); Edward H. Stiglitz & Aviv Caspi, Observability and Reasoned Discourse: 
Evidence from the U.S. Senate 3–4 (Mar. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding 
that the introduction of C-SPAN led to greater discursive “herding” among senators from the same party 
and to a significant decrease in “the amount of time [spent] debating live bills and resolutions” versus 
“posturing for constituents”); see also Susan Davis, Not Everyone Is a Fan of C-SPAN Cameras in 
Congress, USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/19/cspan-
anniversary/6577593 [https://perma.cc/AF6X-LW4U] (quoting Representative Don Young for the view 
that C-SPAN is “probably the worst thing that happened to the Congress”). 
138 See SARAH J. ECKMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44665, VIDEO BROADCASTING OF 
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEEDINGS 5–10 (2017). 
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Figure 13: C-SPAN and Constitutional Polarization 
 
 
 
Figure 13 reveals that after the introduction of C-SPAN1 in the House, the relative CCR for 
constitutional remarks in that chamber increased slightly, and then declined following C-SPAN2’s 
introduction in the Senate.  This pattern is consistent with the notion that television coverage of 
floor proceedings helped foster a more polarized constitutional rhetoric. 
 
Nevertheless, we interpret this result cautiously for a number of reasons.  First, C-SPAN’s 
staggered introduction in the House and Senate was not an exogenous shock, and it is possible that 
certain members of the House voted in 1979 in favor of video coverage because they were willing 
or eager to speak on the floor in a more partisan manner.  Second, the magnitude of movement in 
relative CCR is small, well inside historical fluctuations.  Third, as the regression results in 
Appendix B demonstrate, the evidence supporting a C-SPAN effect does not appear to hold across 
standard statistical robustness checks.139  Fourth, as the middle chart shows, we do not observe a 
comparable effect for nonconstitutional documents even though transparency plausibly functions 
similarly in both contexts.140  And fifth, for a difference-in-differences strategy to be reliable, the 
treatment and control groups must have exhibited parallel trends prior to the initial shock.  As the 
leftmost set of dots on each chart reflects, however, pre-1979 partisanship levels in the House and 
Senate exhibit significant volatility (for both constitutional and nonconstitutional documents).  
Although our results are consistent with the hypothesis that cable news coverage contributed to 
 
139 See infra App. B, tbl. B.3.  Most notably, the effects of C-SPAN1 and C-SPAN2 are statistically 
significant in a model without speaker fixed effects, but they largely disappear once we add speaker fixed 
effects.  Although one can certainly debate the appropriateness of including speaker fixed effects in this 
context, as explained in Appendix B, it nonetheless remains appropriate to interpret these results with 
caution. 
140 This finding is broadly consistent with Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy’s working paper, which does 
not attempt to exploit the staggered introduction of C-SPAN in the House and Senate, but which finds little 
indication in its time-series trends that C-SPAN was “the proximate cause of increased partisanship” in the 
1980s and 1990s (although it may well have “provided an important complement to linguistic innovation”).  
Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 25. 
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the polarization of constitutional discourse, we are unable to measure such an effect with much 
statistical confidence.141 
 
 
D. The Vocabulary of Constitutional Partisanship 
 
Finally, our data set can shed light on the polarization of constitutional discourse by allowing 
us to study patterns of usage of particular expressions.  As explained above, legal scholars have 
argued that Democratic and Republican officials have become increasingly attached to distinct 
constitutional themes and tropes over the past four decades, as exemplified by the rise of 
“originalism” on the Republican side.142  Although aggregate trends in polarization are more 
rigorously assessed through the methods employed in Part IV, this scholarship suggests that it is 
worthwhile to look into some especially salient terms that may be doing outsized work in 
differentiating the parties’ contemporary constitutional rhetoric. 
 
Figures 14A and 14B display word clouds associated with the utilization of terms in our 
broadest constitutional dictionary, the Expansive dictionary, for two historical periods: 1959 to 
1976 and 1999 to 2016.  The earlier period predates the recent surge in polarization of 
constitutional discourse; the later period captures the surge at its apex.  Figure 14A shows the fifty 
most distinctive terms regardless of party in congressional floor remarks from each period, with 
size scaled to a term’s distinctiveness.143  In other words, these are the fifty constitutionally 
freighted terms that are most strongly “owned” by one particular party during the years in question.  
Figure 14B offers a slight twist on Figure 14A.  It shows the twenty-five most distinctive terms of 
each party, again with a total of fifty terms (this time half owned by Democrats, half owned by 
Republicans) and again with size scaled to a term’s distinctiveness (relative to other terms owned 
by the same party).  Figure 14C replicates the analysis of 14A for the Obama presidency 
specifically, the last full presidency for which we have data.  All terms in all word clouds are color-
coded based on which party uses the term most frequently.  Blue font signifies Democratic-owned 
terms; red font signifies Republican-owned terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
141 It is possible that the C-SPAN effect we observe is dampened due to the limited availability of cable 
television in some regions of the United States while the Federal Communications Commission was 
gradually deregulating the cable industry beginning in the 1970s.  See generally Stanley M. Besen & Robert 
W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 1981, at 77.  
Rather than exploiting the staggered introduction of C-SPAN in the House and the Senate, future work 
might use the staggered introduction of cable television across different members’ voting districts as a 
shock that allows for a convincing identification strategy. 
142 See supra notes 23–24, 33–37 and accompanying text. 
143 “Distinctiveness” refers to the difference in the relative frequency with which a term is used across 
the two major parties.  For instance, if Republicans use a term ten times for every 10,000 words they speak, 
whereas Democrats use it eight times, then the distinctiveness is 
10
10,000
−
8
10,000
= 0.0002. 
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Figure 14A: Fifty Most Distinctive Terms Across Parties, Expansive Dictionary 
 
1959–1976                                                              1999–2016 
        
 
Figure 14B: Twenty-Five Most Distinctive Terms of Each Party, Expansive Dictionary 
 
1959–1976                                                              1999–2016 
        
 
Figure 14C: Fifty Most Distinctive Terms Across Parties, Expansive Dictionary 
 
   Obama First Term                                                  Obama Second Term 
        
 
Without hyperbole, we think it is fair to say that these results are stunning.  In the 1959–1976 
period, Figure 14A shows, congressional Democrats had a far more distinctive and robust 
constitutional vocabulary than Republicans did.  In the 1999–2016 period, the opposite was true—
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with the important exceptions that the terms “civil rights” and “voting rights” remained squarely 
in the Democratic fold.  Put (overly) simply, Democrats used to dominate constitutional discourse.  
Now Republicans do. 
 
The specific content of the word clouds is interesting as well.  (For those readers who wish to 
see a much more detailed visual record of the history of constitutional discourse in Congress, the 
Online Appendix contains comparable word clouds for every Congress in our data set.144)  
Invocation of the “first amendment,” to take just one term, flips from being primarily a Democratic 
practice to primarily a Republican practice between the two periods—a dramatic demonstration of 
ideological drift.145  More broadly, whereas terms associated with the Framers’ Constitution have 
become strongly associated with the contemporary Republican Party, terms associated with the 
Reconstruction Amendments have become strongly associated with the contemporary Democratic 
Party—a dramatic demonstration of the “constant,” and now highly partisan, “struggle” in 
constitutional politics “between the values of the Founding and the values of Reconstruction.”146 
 
Figure 15 fleshes out these observations a bit further.  It traces the evolution over time of 
Democratic and Republican usage of a select set of notable terms for every million words spoken: 
“first amendment,” “second amendment,” “tenth amendment,” “equal protection,” “fourteenth 
amendment,” and the combined set of terms in our Originalism dictionary (described in section 
III.A147 and reproduced in full in Appendix A).  The selection of these terms on which to focus is 
inherently arbitrary at some level, but it is nonetheless instructive as to the phrase-level drivers of 
discursive polarization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 Online App., figs. OA.1–2. 
145 This demonstration is consistent with the qualitative First Amendment literature.  See, e.g., Jeremy 
K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 
1969 (2018) (“Cases in which ‘individuals or groups commonly thought of as “conservative” took up the 
First Amendment cudgels against regulatory forces supported by individuals or groups commonly thought 
to be “liberals”’ began to multiply in the late 1970s and 1980s, both in the economic realm and beyond.” 
(quoting Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 
941 (1993))). 
146 Kermit Roosevelt III, Reconstruction and Resistance, 91 TEX. L. REV. 121, 141 (2012); see also 
Pozen, supra note 26, at 927 (noting that while “[c]onservative commentators routinely depict interpretive 
approaches associated with left-liberals . . . as tainted by imperfect loyalty to the canonical document” or 
“the Framers,” a parallel “strain of commentary on the political left accuses conservatives of refusing to 
accept the full scope of constitutional change wrought by the Reconstruction Amendments”).  “The 
Founding,” according to Kermit Roosevelt, “stands for individual liberty, for limited federal power, for the 
ability of states to run their internal affairs as they see fit.”  Roosevelt, supra, at 141–42.  “Reconstruction 
stands for equality, for broader federal authority, for federal rights and federal laws protecting individuals 
from their own states.”  Id. at 142. 
147 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 15: Partisan Discrepancies in Constitutional Language 
 
 
 
These results largely speak for themselves.  Ownership of “first amendment” began to switch 
parties in the 1980s.  Democrats no longer own the terms “equal protection” and “fourteenth 
amendment,” or indeed invoke them all that frequently, relative to their rhetoric during the civil 
rights revolution.  Congressional references to the Second Amendment started to rise well in 
advance of the Supreme Court’s 2008 watershed decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,148 
around which time they skyrocketed.  More surprisingly, Democrats were, if anything, more likely 
than Republicans to appeal to originalist tropes and the Tenth Amendment in the mid-twentieth 
century;149 starting in the 1970s, Republicans came to dominate these vocabularies.  Again, our 
 
148 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
149 Loosely in line with this finding, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 92 
(2013) (arguing that while the liberal Warren Court justices are “often accused of ignoring the original 
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Online Appendix offers much more detail, with comparable charts for every single term in the 
Expansive dictionary.150  The six charts in Figure 15 are revealing in their own right.  They also 
give a taste of how narrower inquiries can fill in some of the details of the larger picture of 
constitutional polarization painted in Part IV. 
 
 
VI. POLARIZED DISCOURSE OUTSIDE CONGRESS 
 
A powerful attribute of our principal methodologies is their flexibility across textual data sets, 
permitting us to analyze constitutional polarization in virtually any well-organized corpus.  To 
provide a basis for comparison with (and a rough robustness check on) the key results discussed 
in Part IV, this Part briefly explores one alternative source of political and constitutional discourse: 
staff editorials in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.  As described in Part II,151 we 
used ProQuest and Factiva to collect 57,884 editorials published between 1993 to November 2018.  
For years prior to 1993, both databases are missing the full text of editorials for one or both sources, 
especially the Journal.  We therefore cabin the analysis below to the 46,242 full-text editorials 
from 1993 to 2018. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Newspaper Editorials Corpus 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 reproduces the analysis behind Figure 3 for our newspaper editorials corpus.  As in 
Figure 3, Figure 16 depicts the relative frequency of “constitutional” documents in this corpus, 
using four different tests of what counts as a constitutional document.  The overall shares of 
newspaper editorials that have constitutional subject matter are substantially higher than the 
comparable figures for congressional floor remarks, and there is a weak upward trend in these 
shares, particularly evident during the Obama and Trump Administrations. 
 
 
 
 
meaning of the Constitution” during the 1950s and 1960s, in fact “originalism survived and even grew in 
importance during the Warren Court era”). 
150 Online App., fig. OA.3. 
151 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  Data restrictions on the availability of Journal editorials 
prior to 1993 unfortunately prevented us from extending the analysis further back in time.   
Overall WSJ NYT Overall WSJ NYT Overall WSJ NYT
Clinton 11,586 4,351 7,235 1,448 544 904 484 549 440
(381) (91) (374) (32) (35) (27)
Bush 14,326 6,087 8,239 1,791 761 1,030 501 566 449
(632) (224) (453) (22) (17) (29)
Obama 15,676 6,076 9,600 1,960 760 1,200 506 560 474
(267) (191) (127) (30) (16) (54)
Trump 4,654 2,684 1,970 2,327  1,342 985 637  604 692
(173) (181) (8) (13) (107) (122)
Total Number of Editorials Average Number of Editorials per Year
(Standard Deviation)
Average Length of Editorials per Year
(Standard Deviation)
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Figure 16: Share of “Constitutional” Editorials (by Year) 
 
 
 
Figure 17 reproduces the analyses behind Figures 4 and 5—our baseline results—for our 
newspaper editorials corpus.  As in Figures 4 and 5, Figure 17 shows the evolution of ideological 
polarization, as measured by our three core metrics of classifier performance, for constitutional 
versus nonconstitutional documents.  Our adaptation here is to identify “speaker” and “ideology” 
with publication outlet, with the Journal proxying for “conservative” speakers and the Times 
proxying for “liberal” speakers.  To facilitate comparisons between these results and the 
Congressional Record results, we lump the editorials into two-year bins corresponding to the 
contemporaneous Congresses.  All panels use the Minimal dictionary and a cutoff criterion of 0 to 
impute constitutional subject matter.  The average length of constitutional editorials in our data set 
is 569 words, while the average length of nonconstitutional editorials is 503 words.  Because this 
difference is relatively small and the number of editorials is relatively modest, we do not match 
editorials by length. 
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Figure 17: Predicting Publication Outlet by Textual Content 
 
 
As all three panels of Figure 17 show, both constitutional and nonconstitutional editorials in 
the Journal and Times grew increasingly polarized over the past twenty-five years, but not always 
at the same rate.  After starting out being substantially less polarized in the early 1990s, 
constitutional editorials had largely caught up with nonconstitutional editorials by the 2000s.  
Levels of constitutional polarization surged again during the second term of the Obama 
Administration and the first two years of the Trump presidency. 
 
We interpret these findings as suggestive though secondary to our findings on Congress.  The 
temporal span of this corpus is much briefer than that of the Congressional Record, and the data 
set is much less rich in content.  Moreover, there is no simple way to control for different style 
guides that the Journal and the Times may be using at any given time.  Nevertheless, it is notable 
that a similar pattern of growing constitutional polarization appears in this corpus as well.  
Additional research into the path of polarization in these newspapers, along with any number of 
other newspapers and media sources, seems well warranted. 
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CONCLUSION: A COMPUTATIONAL AGENDA FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP 
 
This Article is the first to use computational techniques to investigate the ideological and 
partisan structure of constitutional discourse outside the courts.  Applying these techniques to 
millions of remarks made on the House and Senate floors as well as tens of thousands of newspaper 
editorials, we are able to demonstrate the explosive growth of constitutional polarization over the 
past four decades and to shed new empirical light on its causes, contours, and implications for the 
separation of powers.  If the fact that Democrats and Republicans “increasingly speak different 
languages . . . contribute[s] to the striking increase in inter-party hostility evident in recent years”152 
and to the prejudices associated with “partyism,”153 our findings suggest that appeals to the 
Constitution are unlikely to offer refuge.  If anything, constitutionalizing policy debates appears 
to make matters worse.  We hope these findings will inform and inspire further research on 
constitutional polarization by scholars from diverse disciplines. 
 
More than that, we hope this Article will inform and inspire computational inquiries into a 
wide array of constitutional subjects.  This inquiry has focused on constitutional polarization in 
the postwar period.  Our data and our methods, however, could fruitfully be employed to 
investigate a virtually limitless number of questions involving constitutional discourse and its 
evolution over time—from the significance of speakers’ sex, age, race, educational background 
(in law or otherwise), tenure in office, and proximity to their next election; to the deliberative 
effects of various procedural rules or of iterated exchanges with members of another political party; 
to the relationship between rates of constitutional rhetoric and congressional productivity; to the 
changing nature of constitutional argumentation during periods of military conflict, political 
violence, major statutory reform (including the passage of quasi-constitutional “super-
statutes”154), Supreme Court confirmation hearings, or formal constitutional amendment.  Recent 
constitutional scholarship, moreover, suggests any number of specific hypotheses that might be 
tested with comparable data and methods—from Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath’s claim that 
following the New Deal, the United States experienced “the disappearance of the discourse of 
constitutional political economy,” in which issues of economic opportunity had been broadly 
understood and debated in constitutional terms;155 to Aziz Rana’s claim that the culture of 
“constitutional veneration” is a relatively recent phenomenon bound up with the Cold War effort 
to justify American imperial ambitions;156 to Jamal Greene’s claim that interpreters tend to resolve 
 
152 Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 26 (citing Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach 
Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405 
(2012)). 
153 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1–8 (defining partyism as 
hostility “to the opposing party and willing[ness] to believe that its members have a host of bad 
characteristics” and reviewing evidence of its emergence in the United States). 
154 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001). 
155 Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An Introduction 
to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1294 (2016).  
Fishkin and Forbath describe this development as “the ‘great forgetting.’” Id. 
156 Aziz Rana, Making American Constitutional Consensus 2 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors); see also Asli Bâli & Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination, 
85 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 264 (2018) (calling attention to “the manner in which [Cold War] constitutionalism 
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debates over “constitutional rules” with reference to originalist sources, but to resolve debates over 
“constitutional standards” with reference to nonoriginalist sources;157 to the suggestion in multiple 
works that conservative constitutional rhetoric has become more likely than its liberal counterpart 
to evoke fearful sentiments158 and to emphasize necessitarian arguments about the Constitution’s 
“real” or “true” meaning rather than explicitly normative arguments sounding in policy or political 
morality.159 
 
This list only begins to scratch the surface.  But that is our point.  At least where large textual 
data sets such as the Congressional Record are available and germane, the study of almost any 
aspect of constitutional discourse and discord stands to benefit from computational analysis of the 
sort this Article has undertaken. 
  
 
creatively married notions of universal inclusion and self-government with racial hierarchies about global 
stewardship”). 
157 Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639 (2016).  Also potentially testable 
through computational methods is the broader claim, made by many, that conservatives tend to prefer 
relatively clear legal rules whereas liberals tend to prefer relatively open-ended legal standards.  See, e.g., 
Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 65, 82 (2002) (“Liberals are said to favor standards, whereas conservatives are said to favor 
rules.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 96 (1992) (discussing “the stereotype that rules are conservative and 
standards liberal”). 
158 See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 971 (“Constitutional narratives of debasement and 
restoration are consonant with a broader type of narrative in contemporary conservative politics: a story 
that something has gone fundamentally awry in the republic, on the order of an existential crisis, and that 
unpatriotic liberals have allowed or caused it to happen.”).  For an overview of “sentiment analysis” in 
computational linguistics and an application to public comments received by U.S. administrative agencies, 
see Michael A. Livermore, Vladimir Eidelman & Brian Grom, Computationally Assisted Regulatory 
Participation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 1003–14 (2018). 
159 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2351 (2015) 
(“Originalists rely on an intuition that the original meaning of a document is its real meaning and that 
anything else is making it up.”); Pozen, supra note 26, at 936–39 (contrasting the arguments advanced by 
“living constitutionalists” with certain originalists’ “claim to a prepolitical, ontologically or conceptually 
required methodology”). 
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APPENDIX A: CONSTITUTIONAL DICTIONARIES 
 
Section III.A explained and defended our decision to use constitutional dictionaries as a basis 
for distinguishing “constitutional” from “nonconstitutional” subject matter.  Parts IV, V, and VI 
demonstrated the ability of a dictionary-based approach, when combined with machine learning, 
to illuminate the contours of constitutional polarization.  This Appendix reproduces the contents 
of the five dictionaries we have created, along with an explanation of some of the contestable 
choices that (inevitably) informed their construction. 
 
We note that although we have discussed the four larger dictionaries with a range of colleagues, 
it certainly remains possible that each could be improved by adding or subtracting specific terms.  
Doing so is extremely unlikely to affect our main results—and by design is incapable of affecting 
our baseline results, which rely on the Minimal dictionary only.  But we welcome future efforts to 
refine these dictionaries if improvements can be identified and justified on reasonably objective 
grounds. 
 
A. Minimal Dictionary 
 
The Minimal dictionary, recall, is limited to the term “constitution” and all variants and stems 
thereof.160 Variants of “constitution” such as “constitutional,” “unconstitutional,” 
“nonconstitutional,” “extraconstitutional,” “constitutionally,” and “unconstitutionally” are 
included.  Variants of “constitute” are excluded.  Our preprocessing of the textual data renders 
capitalization and punctuation irrelevant.161 Accordingly, the Minimal dictionary consists of all 
variants of: 
 
constitution 
 
B. Textual Dictionary 
 
The Textual dictionary includes the Minimal dictionary and, in addition, the titles of all 
constitutional articles, amendments, and clauses, both in their standard legal formulations and in 
well-recognized colloquial synonyms.  Along with rendering capitalization and punctuation 
irrelevant, our stemming process guarantees that we identify each term in all of our dictionaries 
regardless of whether the term (or any distinct words within the term) appear in their singular or 
plural form.  For terms including Arabic numbers, we also scan for alternative spellings and 
combine the counts.  The entry for “1st amendment” below thus stands in for “first amendment” 
and “1st amendment” as well as “1st amendment.” 
  
 
160 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
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The titles of constitutional clauses were culled from a variety of sources, principally Cornell 
Law School’s Legal Information Institute,162 The Heritage Guide to the Constitution,163 The U.S. 
Constitution On-Line,164 and Wikipedia.165  Any reference to a constitutional clause in any of these 
sources is included.  Also included are a number of “powers” that are allocated by the Constitution 
to specific actors (for example, the “pardon power”) and tend to be invoked as metonyms for 
specific clauses.  The term “preamble,” however, is excluded on account of how frequently it is 
invoked in the Congressional Record in connection with pending bills and resolutions rather than 
in connection with the Constitution. 
 
In addition to the contents of the Minimal dictionary, the Textual dictionary contains:
10th amendment 
11th amendment 
12th amendment 
13th amendment 
14th amendment 
15th amendment 
16th amendment 
17th amendment 
1808 clause 
18th amendment 
19th amendment 
1st amendment 
20th amendment 
21st amendment 
22nd amendment 
23rd amendment 
24th amendment 
25th amendment 
26th amendment 
27th amendment 
2nd amendment 
3/5 clause 
3rd amendment 
 
162 Constitutional Clauses, CORNELL LAW SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_clauses [https://perma.cc/8UHW-7A89] (last visited Jan. 
19, 2019). 
163 The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/constitution 
[https://perma.cc/B7JF-Y5DP] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  Upon clicking on any given article or 
amendment on the left-hand side of the page, a list of clauses contained within that article or amendment 
appears on the right-hand side. 
164 Popular Names of Sections and Clauses, U.S. CONST. ON-LINE, 
https://www.usconstitution.net/constpop.html [https://perma.cc/UGQ2-W9RG] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
165 List of Clauses of the United States Constitution, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_clauses_of_the_United_States_Constitution 
[https://perma.cc/37M2-C7NW] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
4th amendment 
5th amendment 
6th amendment 
7th amendment 
8th amendment 
9th amendment 
admission clause 
advice and consent clause 
appellate jurisdiction clause 
appointment clause 
appointment power 
appropriation clause 
arising clause 
army clause 
arraignment clause 
article five 
article four 
article one 
article seven 
article six 
article three 
article two 
assistance-of-counsel clause 
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attestation clause 
bankruptcy clause 
basket clause 
bear arms amendment 
bill of rights 
borrowing clause 
capture clause 
case or controversy clause 
census clause 
citizenship clause 
civil war amendments 
coefficient clause 
coinage clause 
comity clause 
commander-in-chief clause 
commerce clause 
commerce power 
compact clause 
compensation clause 
compulsory process clause 
confrontation clause 
congressional enforcement clause 
contract clause 
copyright and patent clause 
copyright clause 
cruel and unusual punishment clause 
declaration-of-war clause 
declare war clause 
define and punish clause 
disestablishment clause 
diversity clause 
diversity-of-citizenship clause 
dormant commerce clause 
double jeopardy clause 
due process clause 
elastic clause 
emoluments clause 
enclave clause 
enforcement clause 
enumeration clause 
equal protection clause 
establishment clause 
exception clause 
excessive bail clause 
excessive fines clause 
export clause 
export taxation clause 
extradition clause 
faithful execution clause 
faithfully executed clause 
foreign commerce clause 
free assembly clause 
free exercise clause 
free press clause 
free speech clause 
freedom of assembly clause 
freedom of religion clause 
freedom of speech clause 
freedom of the press clause 
fugitive slave clause 
full faith and credit clause 
general welfare clause 
good behavior clause 
grand jury clause 
guarantee clause 
guaranty clause 
impartial jury clause 
impeachment clause 
impeachment power 
implied powers clause 
import/export clause 
income tax amendment 
incompatibility clause 
indian commerce clause 
ineligibility clause 
inferior officer clause 
information clause 
interstate commerce clause 
interstate rendition clause 
journal clause 
judicial compensation clause 
just compensation clause 
land grant jurisdiction clause 
liberty clause 
loyalty clause 
meetings of congress clause 
migration or importation clause 
militia clause 
naturalization clause 
navy clause 
necessary and proper clause 
new states clause 
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oath-of-office clause 
oath clause 
opinion clause 
orders, resolutions, and votes clause 
original jurisdiction clause 
origination clause 
pardon clause 
pardon power 
pardon power clause 
patent and copyright clause 
petition clause 
port preference clause 
postal clause 
postal power clause 
power of impeachment 
power of the purse 
power to tax 
power-of-the-purse clause 
power-to-tax-clause 
presentment clause 
presidential eligibility clause 
presidential succession clause 
privileges and immunities clause 
privileges or immunities clause 
prohibition amendment 
property clause 
public trial clause 
qualifications clause 
ratification clause 
reception clause 
recess appointment clause 
recess appointment power 
recommendations clause 
reconstruction amendments 
reexamination clause 
republican form clause 
republican-form-of-government clause 
reserve clause 
revenue clause 
right to bear arms amendment 
right-to-counsel clause 
rules and expulsion clause 
search and seizure clause 
self-incrimination clause 
sinecure clause 
slavery amendment 
speech and debate clause 
speech or debate clause 
speedy trial clause 
spending clause 
spending power 
statement and account clause 
subscription clause 
supremacy clause 
suspension clause 
sweeping clause 
take care clause 
takings clause 
taxing and spending clause 
taxing and spending power 
taxing power 
territorial clause 
title of nobility clause 
tonnage clause 
treason clause 
treaty clause 
treaty power 
treaty-making power 
trial by jury clause 
trial-by-jury clause 
uniformity clause 
vacancies clause 
vesting clause 
veto power 
vicinage clause 
war clause 
war power clause 
warrant clause 
womens suffrage amendment 
 
 
 
C. Extended Textual Dictionary 
 
The Extended Textual dictionary includes the Minimal and Textual dictionaries and, in 
addition, dozens of familiar phrases that appear in the text of the Constitution and lack a common 
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extraconstitutional usage.  The selection of these phrases is inherently subjective.  On the one hand, 
we opted to exclude phrases such as “state of the union” and “general welfare” that appear to have 
crossed over to a significant degree into the extraconstitutional realm, in the sense that their 
invocation does not reliably conjure up the Constitution for speakers or listeners.  On the other 
hand, we opted to include certain textual phrases, such as “executive power,” that arguably share 
this same problem (although to a lesser degree, in our estimation).  We also exclude all institutions 
created by the Constitution, such as the Electoral College and the Senate, as these institutions are 
routinely invoked in political commentary without any apparent intent or effect of making a 
constitutional claim. 
 
In addition to the contents of the Minimal and Textual dictionaries, the Extended Textual 
dictionary contains: 
 
advice and consent 
aid and comfort 
among the several states 
appellate jurisdiction 
assistance of counsel 
bear arms 
bill of attainder 
blessings of liberty 
commander-in-chief 
cruel and unusual punishment 
direct taxes 
domestic tranquility 
due process 
emoluments 
equal protection 
establishment of religion 
ex post facto 
excessive bail 
excessive fines 
executive power 
faithfully executed 
free exercise 
freedom of speech 
full faith and credit 
habeas corpus 
high crimes and misdemeanors 
impartial jury 
inferior courts 
inferior officers 
involuntary servitude 
judicial power 
just compensation 
lay and collect taxes 
legislative powers 
letters of marque and reprisal 
life liberty or property 
more perfect union 
natural-born citizen 
necessary and proper 
oath or affirmation 
obligation of contracts 
office of profit or trust 
original jurisdiction 
peaceably to assemble 
privileges and immunities 
privileges or immunities 
progress of science and useful arts 
provide and maintain a navy 
provide for the common defense 
public trial 
raise and support armies 
regulate commerce 
religious test 
republican form of government 
reserved to the states 
retained by the people 
right to be confronted 
rule of naturalization 
rules of its proceedings 
searches and seizures 
shall take care 
title of nobility 
we the people 
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D. Originalism Dictionary 
 
Unlike the Textual, Extended Textual, and Expansive dictionaries, the Originalism dictionary 
does not build on the others but rather was created specifically to investigate the evolution of 
“originalist” rhetoric.  It is therefore devoted to terms related to the constitutional founding and 
the Constitution’s original meaning.  The construction of this list, too, is inherently subjective.  For 
instance, we opted to exclude the names of specific framers, as even a cursory perusal of the 
Congressional Record shows the risk of false positives to be extremely high.  (There are dozens of 
schools and other institutions that have “George Washington” in their names.)  However, we opted 
to include “textualism” on account of its close conceptual affinity with “originalism,” even though 
the term may refer to a theory of statutory as well as constitutional interpretation. 
 
The Originalism dictionary contains: 
  
3/5 compromise 
anti-federalist 
articles of confederation 
committee of detail 
constitutional convention 
continental congress 
declaration of independence 
federal convention 
federalist 
founders 
founding fathers 
framers 
original intention 
original meaning 
original public meaning 
original understanding 
originalism 
originalist 
philadelphia convention 
strict construction 
strict constructionism 
textualism 
textualist 
 
E. Expansive Dictionary 
 
Finally, the Expansive dictionary includes all four of the preceding dictionaries and, in 
addition, over 100 important constitutional concepts that are at least several decades old.  We 
impose this age requirement to avoid extreme presentism in results that make use of this dictionary.  
The construction of this dictionary is especially subjective.  We derived its contents from the 
indices of three leading constitutional law casebooks,166 as well as a “constitutional glossary” 
created for students by the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.167 
 
In general, we aimed to construct this dictionary in an encompassing fashion, sweeping in 
numerous terms whose “constitutional-ness” might be debated, on the view that overinclusiveness 
is preferable to underinclusiveness for purposes of a catch-all, final dictionary.  Yet at the risk of 
 
166 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(7th ed. 2018); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2017); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & 
NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (19th ed. 2016). 
167 Donald A. Ritchie & Justice Learning.org, Our Constitution: Constitutional Glossary, ANNENBERG 
PUB. POL’Y CTR. (2017), https://www.annenbergclassroom.org/resource/our-constitution/our-constitution-
glossary [https://perma.cc/Q4JA-5N4F]. 
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losing some potentially interesting information, we decided against using case names (as well as 
institutions) in this dictionary because of their inherent time-boundedness.  No one could invoke 
“Roe v. Wade,” for instance, before the eponymous lawsuit was filed in 1970.  For a similar reason, 
we exclude terms such as “commandeering,” “undue burden,” and “congruence and 
proportionality” that did not appear in constitutional discourse until they were introduced by the 
Court in recent cases.168 
 
In addition to the contents of the Minimal, Textual, Extended Textual, and Originalism 
dictionaries, the Expansive dictionary contains: 
 
abortion right 
access to court 
activist court 
activist judge 
administrative state 
advisory opinion 
affirmative action 
alienage discrimination 
anti-discrimination 
apportionment 
badges and incidents 
bicameralism 
birthright citizenship 
case or controversy 
checks and balances 
civil liberties 
civil rights 
class legislation 
clear-and-present danger 
colorblindness 
compelled speech 
concurrent powers 
conditional spending 
congressional enforcement 
congressional power 
countermajoritarian 
court packing 
court stripping 
delegation of power 
democratic legitimacy 
departmentalism 
desegregation 
dilution of votes 
 
168 See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (congruence and proportionality); 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (undue burden); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (commandeering). 
discrete-and-insular 
disenfranchisement 
disparate impact 
disparate treatment 
double jeopardy 
economic liberty 
economic right 
emergency power 
eminent domain 
enumerated power 
enumerated right 
equal footing 
equal rights 
equality 
executive detention 
executive privilege 
faithful execution 
federal government power 
federal jurisdiction 
federal power 
federalism 
flag burning 
free press 
free speech 
freedom of assembly 
freedom of association 
freedom of contract 
freedom of expression 
freedom of petition 
freedom of religion 
freedom of the press 
fundamental fairness 
fundamental interest 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351339 
63 
 
fundamental right 
gay rights 
gender discrimination 
gender equality 
heightened scrutiny 
historical gloss 
implied power 
incorporated rights 
indefinite detention 
individual right 
inherent powers 
intermediate scrutiny 
interposition 
interstate compact 
judicial activism 
judicial deference 
judicial immunity 
judicial review 
judicial supremacy 
jurisdiction stripping 
jury trial 
justiciable 
legislative immunity 
legislative veto 
liberty 
life tenure 
lifetime tenure 
line-item veto 
malapportionment 
minimum rationality 
national-origin discrimination 
negative right 
neutral principles 
nondelegation 
nonjusticiable 
nullification 
oath of office 
obscenity 
official discrimination 
one-person-one-vote 
overbreadth 
packing the court 
plenary power 
pocket veto 
police power 
political expression 
political question 
political speech 
poll tax 
popular sovereignty 
positive right 
preemption 
presidential eligibility 
presidential immunity 
presidential power 
presidential privilege 
presidential succession 
press freedom 
prior restraint 
property right 
public forum 
race discrimination 
race equality 
race-based discrimination 
racial discrimination 
racial equality 
racial gerrymandering 
racial integration 
racial profiling 
racial redistricting 
racially discriminatory 
rational basis review 
rational basis test 
rationality review 
reapportionment 
reconstruction powers 
religious freedom 
removal power 
reproductive rights 
reverse discrimination 
reverse incorporation 
right of abortion 
right of free speech 
right of petition 
right of privacy 
right of self-defense 
right to abortion 
right to confront 
right to counsel 
right to education 
right to free speech 
right to petition 
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right to privacy 
right to self-defense 
right to travel 
right to vote 
segregation 
self-defense right 
self-incrimination 
separate-but-equal 
separation of church and state 
separation of powers 
sex discrimination 
sex equality 
sex-based discrimination 
sexual equality 
sexual orientation equality 
sexual-orientation discrimination 
signing statement 
sovereign immunity 
speedy trial 
stare decisis 
state action 
state discrimination 
state sovereignty 
states rights 
strict scrutiny 
suffrage 
suspect class 
suspect classification 
takings 
time place and manner 
trial by jury 
unenumerated right 
unitary executive 
void for vagueness 
vote dilution 
voting right 
wall of separation 
war power 
warrant requirement 
womens equality
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APPENDIX B: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
This Appendix describes results from several regression analyses referenced in Part V’s 
exploration of possible drivers of constitutional polarization. 
 
Table B.1 contains a kinked regression specification accompanying the results described in 
section V.A (and the lower panel of Figure 10) regarding asymmetric constitutional polarization.  
The table uses “constitutional” documents that trigger the Minimal dictionary and estimates the 
relationship between the measured partisanship of these documents (per our classifier) and various 
nontext attributes.  In particular, we estimate the relationship: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ (𝑃𝑅 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽2 ∙ (𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖) + 𝛽3 ∙ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖) 
+𝛽4 ∙ (𝑃𝑅 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) × (𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖) + 𝛽5 ∙ (𝑃𝑅 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) × (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖) 
+𝛽6 ∙ (𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖) × (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖) 
+𝛽7 ∙ (𝑃𝑅 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) × (𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖) × (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖  , 
 
(B1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖 denotes our classifier’s probability assessment that a given speaker is conservative; 
(𝑃𝑅 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖) is dimension one of the speaker’s Poole-Rosenthal (PR) score based on roll-call 
votes; (𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖) is an indicator variable set to 1 if the remark occurs during the later period 
(1999–2016) from Figure 10; (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖) is an indicator variable set to 1 if the speaker’s 
voting record is conservative (also according to PR scores); and 𝜀𝑖 is an error term. 
 
Not surprisingly, the intensity of the speaker’s PR Score (as reflected in the estimate for 𝛽1) 
strongly predicts the classifier’s confidence in assessing her speech.  The main coefficient of 
interest, however, is the regression “kink” coefficient 𝛽7, whose strong positive estimates imply 
that in the late period partisanship increased significantly among ideologically extreme 
conservatives.  Although all estimated effects are statistically significant owing to the large sample 
size, the sheer magnitude of the estimated kink coefficient is particularly striking, swamping even 
the predictive magnitude of the unconditional PR Score. 
 
Table B.2 provides regression estimates of the extent to which being “out of power” predicts 
a greater proclivity to invoke the Constitution, tracking the panels of Figure 11.  We calculate total 
“counts” of constitutional remarks made by Democrats and Republicans each year, and thus all 
specifications in the table estimate a negative binomial regression with an “offset” parameter (not 
reported) equal to the total number of remarks made by members of the party in the observed year.  
The four subpanels of the table utilize four different imputation protocols for deeming a remark to 
be “constitutional.”  For each protocol, we also estimate the relationship for different eras (pre-
1940, 1940–1979, 1980–2016).  The top panel uses a maximum-likelihood approach with negative 
binomial functional form to estimate implicitly the hazard-rate relationship: 
 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2 ∙ (𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3 ∙ (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
(B2) 
 
where 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 represents the hazard rate governing a negative binomial distribution function for party 
i (Democrats, Republicans) at time t.  The key indicator variable (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡) takes on the value 
of 1 whenever the chamber is not controlled by the same party as group i (and 0 otherwise).  In the 
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bottom panel of the table, we pool the chambers and redefine (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖) to take on the value 
of 1 if the president is not from the same party as group i (and 0 otherwise), or: 
 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2 ∙ (𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. (B3) 
 
Note that while both specifications suggest a greater countermajoritarian proclivity to invoke the 
Constitution (that is, 𝛽1 > 0) over the entire panel, the estimated effect appears inconsistent over 
time.  In particular, in the period from 1940 to 1979, the countermajoritarian use of constitutional 
rhetoric is dampened (top panel) or slightly reversed (bottom panel) relative to the other eras. 
 
Finally, Table B.3 augments section V.C and Figure 13 to consider whether the staggered 
introduction of C-SPAN1 and C-SPAN2 in the House and Senate, respectively, was related to 
greater degrees of discursive polarization (as measured by CCR).  The introduction of the two 
networks took place approximately seven years apart, allowing us to measure two distinct “shocks” 
to each chamber, using the other chamber as a control group.  In the left-hand panel, we estimate 
various permutations of the relationship: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2 ∙ (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁 1𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3 ∙ (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁 2𝑖,𝑡) + 
𝛽4 ∙ (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) × (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁 1𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5 ∙ (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) × (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁 2𝑖,𝑡)  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
(B4) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 denotes our text classifier’s probability assessment that speaker i who gives a speech at 
time t is conservative; (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) is an indicator variable set to 1 if the speaker is a senator at the 
time the speech is delivered; and (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁 1𝑖,𝑡) and (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁 2𝑖,𝑡) are indicator 
variables set to 1 if the speech is given after the introduction of C-SPAN1 and C-SPAN2, 
respectively.  The first three columns of Table B.3 do not include “fixed effects” for the speaker; 
such fixed effects are introduced in the final three columns.  In columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, where we 
track only one event, we use a three-year window around that event.  In columns 3 and 6 where 
we track two events, we use a window beginning three years before the introduction of C-SPAN1 
and ending three years after the introduction of C-SPAN2. 
 
Beginning with the left-hand columns of Table B.3, the two coefficients of interest are on the 
cross-product terms, 𝛽4 and 𝛽5.  Here, the estimated coefficients cohere with the hypothesis that 
constitutional discourse became more polarized in each chamber following the introduction of 
cable television coverage.  Remarks in the House became more polarized than in the Senate (𝛽4 <
0) after the introduction of C-SPAN1; and Senate remarks did the same (relative to the House) 
after the introduction of C-SPAN2 (𝛽5 > 0).  That said, note that introducing speaker fixed effects 
tends to wash away the C-SPAN effect.  This result causes us to temper our assessment that cable 
television coverage contributed to polarization in a causal fashion. 
 
On the other hand, there are aspects of our approach that are not particularly conducive to a 
speaker fixed-effects estimation.  For example, certain members of Congress, particularly in the 
House, do not survive across both measurement periods.  Moreover, the reasons for their 
nonsurvival (through retirement or failed reelection bid) are plausibly related to unflattering 
appearances on C-SPAN.  All told, we view the results in Table B.3 as being supportive, but not 
definitively so, of a C-SPAN effect in legislators’ constitutional speech. 
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